Written by: Ayoub Al-Farsi, a member of the Central Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee
There is broad agreement that the Ministry of Finance is the entity with the original jurisdiction over budget management, and that financial disclosure is an acknowledgment of the sound legal foundation upon which the state should operate. The Central Bank’s recent position does not stem from an attempt to “evade responsibility,” but rather represents a necessary step toward restoring matters to their proper institutional framework.
To fully understand the situation, the following points must be taken into consideration:
Supporting unification, not abolishing jurisdiction: The Central Bank’s sponsorship of financial arrangements or unified spending agreements was not an attempt to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. Rather, these were exceptional measures imposed by a state of extreme necessity to prevent the financial collapse resulting from the governmental division.
These steps were intended to build bridges between the parties to ensure the continued payment of salaries and provision of essential services to citizens, not to permanently strip the ministry of its jurisdiction.
The nature of financial data: Yes, the Central Bank is the source of financing and the channel through which all expenditures pass. However, its data consists of cash inflows and outflows (Cash Flow), rather than accounting records and detailed sectoral budgets showing actual expenditures, their supporting documentation, and their legality. These are the exclusive responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance and the oversight authorities.
Publishing comprehensive and accurately classified data is purely a financial function, and the Central Bank’s continued prominence in this area reinforces institutional disorder rather than addressing it.
Imposing fees and monetary policy: Proposals to impose fees on foreign currency cash sales—which are mistakenly interpreted as taxes—are tools that fall squarely within the scope of monetary policy and the responsibility to defend the value of the national currency and curb inflation when government fiscal policies are unable to control public spending.
These are internationally recognized tools in situations of structural crises, regardless of whether they are appropriate or not; the issue here is one of jurisdiction.
Correcting the course starts somewhere: The Central Bank’s previous interventions were “emergency measures” aimed at saving what could be saved in the absence of unified budgets. Today, insisting that the Ministry of Finance fulfill its role in publishing data and governing public spending is the beginning of genuinely correcting the course and returning to a state governed by law and institutions.
This is not a contradiction in positions. Continuing an exceptional mistake and turning it into a permanent rule does not build a state.
