Al-Hdhiri: Libya’s Gas Security Between Abundant Resources and the Possibility of Imports: Where Does the Problem Lie?

Written by: Oil Legal Expert Othman Al-Hdhiri

Libya is currently facing a paradox that deserves serious consideration. While the country possesses significant natural gas reserves and promising geological potential, growing indications suggest the possibility of turning to international markets to import gas to meet domestic demand, whether to operate power plants, supply various industries, or meet the growing demand for energy.

If this indication or scenario materializes, the issue should not be reduced to the decision to import gas itself, but rather to the reasons that have brought Libya’s oil and gas sector to this point. Gas imports may be a temporary technical or economic option under certain circumstances, but turning them into a permanent policy for a country with these resources requires a comprehensive review of its investment policies, management, and strategic economic planning.

The gas sector was expected to witness an expansion in exploration and development activities in recent years, with priority given to projects capable of increasing domestic production and strengthening energy security.

Among the issues discussed at the time during the tenure of Engineer Mohamed Aoun was the development of the NC7 block and the Arous Al-Bahr project, as both were viewed as projects capable of supporting gas production if implemented within a clear national vision based on Libyan expertise and national financing whenever possible and economically viable, as our national experts had emphasized.

Today, a number of legitimate questions arise that deserve clear institutional answers:

Why were these projects not implemented according to the plans announced or discussed at the time by the Ministry under Engineer Aoun?

Were there technical or economic justifications that prevented their implementation, or did investment priorities change?

What were the criteria underlying decisions to bring new partners into some of these projects? Were these decisions subject to standards of competitiveness and transparency and aimed at achieving the best value for the state?

Was an objective comparison conducted between developing the projects using national capabilities, partnering with the National Oil Corporation’s traditional partners, and pursuing other proposed alternatives?

These questions should not be interpreted as casting doubt on any institution or accusing any party. Rather, they are part of the public and experts’ right to evaluate public policies, particularly in a sector that represents the backbone of the Libyan economy.

The success of any partnership in the oil and gas sector should not be measured by the nationality of the partner, but by its ability to provide genuine added value, transfer technology, accelerate field development, and deliver the best economic return for the state, while fully adhering to governance and transparency standards.

Conversely, any investment project that lacks clarity or raises questions about the mechanisms through which it was selected will remain subject to debate, regardless of its stated objectives.

Energy security is also no longer merely a matter of production; it has become part of national security. Shortfalls in gas supplies directly affect electricity generation, industry, public expenditure, and the state’s ability to achieve economic development.

Therefore, delaying the development of gas fields or obstructing strategic investments carries economic and social costs that may be far higher than the cost of implementing these projects at the appropriate time. (See the experience of offshore gas development, the Mellitah and Al-Wafa facilities, which were financed through local Libyan bank loans.)

What is required today is the launch of a comprehensive professional review of Libya’s gas strategy. This should include an objective assessment of delayed projects, a review of investment priorities, accelerating the development of fields capable of production, strengthening the role of Libyan expertise, and benefiting from international partners without imposing specific entities on them, as we observed at the time. We must emphasize effective partners that deliver genuine added value, away from any considerations unrelated to technical merit.

It is also essential for the relevant authorities to adopt greater transparency in presenting their plans clearly to the public by publishing indicators related to production, domestic demand, the projected supply gap, and the reasons behind delays to certain projects, so that the debate is based on information rather than speculation, as is currently the case amid ongoing confusion.

Ultimately, the question is not whether Libya will import gas or not. Rather, it concerns how a national resource that is supposed to serve as the foundation for achieving self-sufficiency and supporting development is managed. Countries are not measured solely by the resources they possess, but by their ability to manage them efficiently and make the right investment decisions at the right time.

The future of Libya’s oil and gas sector deserves a responsible national debate in which facts take precedence over courtesies, studies over impressions, and the public interest over any other considerations.

Answering these questions is not an intellectual luxury, but a necessity for building an oil sector capable of meeting Libya’s needs today, protecting its strategic interests in the future, and safeguarding the future of coming generations.