The Decode39 website reported “China in Libya: why Beijing’s return matters in the Mediterranean.” After more than a decade of absence, China is once again moving openly in Libya. Here is what we are watching. The reopening of the Chinese embassy in Tripoli on November 12 does not represent an isolated diplomatic gesture, but rather a signal of a broader strategy aimed at strengthening China’s presence in North Africa as an economic and logistical actor, while avoiding direct political involvement in Libya’s internal dynamics. At the same time, Beijing is positioning itself in Tripoli in anticipation of potential future regional realignments.
The website continued: The grip of anger: China’s return was symbolically cemented on November 12, when Chargé d’Affaires Liu Jian met senior officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of National Unity, receiving clear signals of openness toward deepening cooperation in the economic, technological, and infrastructure sectors.
Decode39 added: Why it matters: Sending an ambassador strengthens the political signal of China’s return and indicates Beijing’s intention to establish a full and active diplomatic presence to accompany and protect the relaunch of its economic initiatives in the country. This step comes at a time when Washington, according to the U.S. National Security Strategy, seeks to prevent the emergence of new regional hegemonies by strategic competitors, foremost among them China.
As a result, Libya becomes a testing ground for global competition in the wider Mediterranean basin, where American, Russian, Turkish, and European interests intersect, while also placing Italy’s ability to defend its interests in a vital theater under scrutiny.
According to the website: The current situation: On the ground, China’s return to Libya has already become tangible through a series of practical activities. State-owned companies, such as China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), are working to revive infrastructure contracts dating back to the Gaddafi era, particularly in the railway sector.
Decode39 also explained that, at the same time, enhanced logistical connectivity is taking shape through new trade routes to the Misrata Free Zone, which serves as a pivotal hub for access to the Libyan market and Mediterranean trade routes. In parallel, technology groups such as Huawei have resumed operations after a period of suspension and obtained licenses in both the Tripoli and Cyrenaica regions, including the implementation of 5G networks. Taken together, these initiatives outline a distributed economic presence aimed at engaging with all Libyan power centers and remaining relevant regardless of the institutional form that may emerge in the future.
The website continued: China’s pragmatic approach: As Chiara De Scala notes, Beijing presents itself as an economic partner to all parties, more interested in projects and implementation than in military alliances. In practice, China is consolidating an economic foothold across Libya’s various centers of power to ensure its presence in any future political configuration. The Chinese diplomatic return should primarily be read as an effort to regain room for maneuver in a file that has remained largely frozen for more than a decade. According to Andrea Ghiselli, Professor of Chinese Foreign Policy at the University of Exeter and Head of Research at “ChinaMed,” the reopening of the embassy in Tripoli signals Beijing’s intention to reestablish itself as a recognized political interlocutor in Libya, without committing to rigid alignment.
The website added that Ghiselli believes China is operating in an environment that remains highly fragmented, where there were also indications in the past of interest in the eastern faction of the country. Accordingly, appointing an ambassador does not imply exclusive alignment with the Tripoli government, but rather reflects an attempt to manage the Libyan file more effectively while keeping channels of communication open with all relevant actors.
The website pointed out that, in this context, Libya appears less central compared to other North African files—such as Morocco—but it remains an important test case for China’s ability to combine diplomatic presence, political caution, and economic ambition in a highly volatile environment.
The website also continued: Between the South China Sea and the Mediterranean: The Libyan file falls within a broader Chinese maritime posture. As Admiral Giuseppe Cavo noted in an analysis published by our sister site Formiche, Beijing is completing its transition from a continental power to a global maritime power, structuring its strategy along two distinct tracks. In the South China Sea, China acts as a resolute regional power with territorial claims; in the Mediterranean, it operates as an economic–logistical power, leveraging ports and trade routes to entrench a strategic and informational presence.
What we are watching: China’s return is not taking place in a vacuum. Turkey and Russia remain central actors on the military and security fronts, while Beijing adds an economic dimension that could generate both tactical intersections and new competition at the same time. For Europe—and Italy in particular—the choice is becoming increasingly clear: either remain observers, or build a credible alternative in Libya’s reconstruction. As for China, it has already begun positioning itself.
