The Shalawi: “Diesel in Libya… A Shortage Crisis or an Access and Distribution Crisis?”

Written by oil and economic expert Abdelmonsef Al-Shalawi:

Between tightness in the international market, pressure from the electricity sector, and challenges in getting fuel to citizens.

One of the most frequently asked questions in Libya today, whether among citizens, economic experts, or energy-sector observers, is: Why has diesel in particular become less available than other fuels, and why has its price in some periods on the unofficial market exceeded five dinars per liter and sometimes even more, while its official price remains around LYD 0.150? Is the problem an internal Libyan one, or is it part of a broader crisis in the global diesel market?

In my assessment, a professional answer cannot be reduced to a single cause, because we are facing a complex crisis combining tightness in the international diesel market on the one hand, rising domestic demand—particularly from the electricity sector—and the distribution and oversight system inside Libya on the other.

More importantly, I believe that the published figures do not support reducing the problem to the claim that the National Oil Corporation or Brega Petroleum Marketing Company have failed to provide the required quantities.

According to National Oil Corporation data for July 2026, the quantities of diesel received from domestic and foreign sources amounted to 625,429 metric tons, including 512,014 tons from abroad, compared with approximately 113,415 tons from domestic sources. This means that nearly 82% of the diesel received by Libya during the month came from foreign markets.

As for the quantities actually distributed during July, they reached 646,899 metric tons, a figure exceeding the amount received during the month due to the use of available stocks in storage facilities as well.

These figures are very important because they tell us, first, that the NOC and Brega are operating in a market in which Libya relies heavily on imports, and second, that substantial quantities are indeed being received, handled, and supplied to the domestic market.

This is precisely where I believe the Libyan crisis needs to be placed in its international context, because the global diesel market in the summer of 2026 is neither a normal nor an easy market for buyers.

Diesel Globally… Money Alone Is No Longer Enough

It is important for the public to understand that the world is not necessarily suffering today from a shortage of crude oil in the same way it is suffering from tight supplies of certain refined products, particularly diesel and middle distillates.

The International Energy Agency indicates that diesel and jet-fuel markets have become more vulnerable to disruptions as a result of declining refining capacity and disrupted flows from the Middle East and Russia. Nearly three million barrels per day of refining capacity in the Gulf region have been affected by conflict and export disruptions, while Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure have reduced Russian refinery operations and refined-product exports.

Russia is a particularly important factor here. Repeated strikes on its refineries have caused unplanned outages and a significant decline in the production and export of petroleum products. Reuters data indicate that Russian seaborne petroleum-product exports fell by around 33% in July compared with June, and by more than 50% compared with July of the previous year, alongside Russian measures to restrict fuel exports in order to protect its domestic market.

The situation has gone as far as some damaged refineries being shut down for extended periods. The Orsk refinery, which has a capacity of around six million tons annually and produces diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel, was hit and completely shut down, with estimates that repairs could take several months.

The crisis is not limited to Russia. Disruptions in the Middle East and maritime routes have reduced the flexibility of refined-product trade, while the United States and India have become major alternative suppliers increasingly sought by buyers. Recent reports have shown global buyers turning heavily toward U.S. and Indian refineries to compensate for supplies lost from Russia and the Middle East.

Therefore, the statement circulating among some energy-market participants that “you may have the money but still be unable to easily obtain the amount of diesel you want” is not far from reality, provided it is understood professionally.

This does not mean that diesel does not exist at all. Rather, it means that a buyer may not be able to easily secure, at the same time, the required quantity, the required technical specification, the loading port, the delivery date, and an acceptable price.

In petroleum-product markets, timing itself is a commodity. You may find the shipment, but only two weeks later; or find it from a more distant origin at a higher transportation cost; or find only part of the required quantity rather than the full amount; or have to pay an additional premium for a seller to allocate a shipment to you.

This simply means that Libya is not currently shopping for diesel in a global market overflowing with barrels. It is competing with countries, companies, power utilities, transport operators, and industrial facilities for a product that has become scarcer and more expensive.

From this perspective, I believe it is fair to acknowledge that the National Oil Corporation and Brega succeeded during July alone in securing more than 625,000 tons of diesel, most of it from abroad, under extremely difficult international conditions.

This is not promotional advocacy for any institution or individual; it is simply an interpretation of the figures within their proper commercial context.

But Where Does the Diesel Go After It Arrives?

The existence of an international factor does not exempt the domestic system from scrutiny. On the contrary, it makes that scrutiny even more important.

Of the 646,899 tons of diesel distributed during July, electricity-generation plants alone received 405,311 tons, representing approximately 63% of the total diesel distributed during the month. Power plants also received additional quantities of heavy fuel oil.

This figure explains a large part of what makes the diesel crisis different from the gasoline crisis.

Diesel in Libya does not only go to cars and trucks. It is a strategic fuel for power plants, heavy transport, factories, agriculture, desalination plants, and various service activities.

When the quantities of natural gas available to power plants decline, or bottlenecks occur in the gas system, plants capable of dual-fuel operation switch, to varying degrees, to diesel or liquid fuels. This suddenly creates a huge block of demand capable of absorbing hundreds of thousands of tons.

This is why the diesel, gas, and electricity issues are more interconnected than some may think.

Every additional quantity of gas that can be delivered regularly to power plants equipped to use it means lower demand for diesel, thereby making larger quantities available for transportation, agriculture, industry, and citizens.

The NOC and Brega… Where Does Their Responsibility Begin and End?

It is important here to distinguish between the different stages of the supply chain.

The National Oil Corporation works to secure supplies within the sector’s overall system, while Brega is responsible for receiving, storing, handling, and supplying fuel to the market through storage facilities and the approved distribution network.

Brega’s own data also confirm that large quantities of fuel continue to be supplied from its storage facilities across different regions.

Therefore, simply saying that “diesel is unavailable because the NOC or Brega failed to provide it” is inconsistent with the published figures.

We have hundreds of thousands of tons being received and huge quantities leaving storage facilities. Therefore, the questions must extend across the entire supply chain:

Who received the quantities?

To whom were they allocated?

How much reached the distribution companies?

How much actually reached the stations?

What is the real demand in each region?

Are there abnormal consumption patterns, leakage, hoarding, speculation, or smuggling?

Here, one of the biggest economic problems in Libya’s fuel system becomes apparent: the enormous gap between the official and parallel-market prices.

When the official price of diesel is LYD 0.150 per liter, while its unofficial-market price exceeded LYD 5 during August, we are looking at a gap of more than 33 times.

Such a gap cannot be viewed as merely a price difference. It is an extremely powerful economic incentive for leakage, speculation, hoarding, and resale outside official channels.

This does not mean accusing any particular party. But any economist or supply-chain specialist knows that a commodity that can be purchased at a nominal price and sold for dozens of times that amount will remain vulnerable to disruption unless there is a highly precise tracking and oversight system.

What Does the Meeting Between the Prime Minister and the NOC Chairman Mean?

From this perspective, the outcome of the meeting held on August 19, 2026, between the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the National Oil Corporation’s Board of Directors takes on practical importance, rather than merely media significance.

The meeting addressed gas and liquid-fuel supplies to power plants, grid requirements, and fuel flows into the market. It resulted in a directive to establish a joint coordination room for daily monitoring and addressing any supply bottlenecks. The NOC chairman also reaffirmed the continuation of supply and distribution operations.

In my view, the effectiveness of this coordination room will depend entirely on the type of data it uses.

If it merely becomes a framework for meetings and exchanging correspondence, little will change.

But if it becomes a genuine data-driven operations room, monitoring daily what arrives at ports, what is unloaded, the inventory levels at each storage facility, quantities leaving each facility, what distribution companies receive, what reaches each station, the consumption of power plants and major consumers, then it could become a highly effective tool for identifying bottlenecks at an early stage.

I believe this is the most useful approach: rather than looking for someone to blame, determine where each liter is from the moment it enters the country until it reaches the final consumer.

Will the Problem End Soon?

For citizens, I believe there is a distinction between the domestic crisis and the tightness of the international market.

Domestically, there could be a noticeable improvement if shipments continue to arrive, inventory management improves, distribution becomes more regular, and bottlenecks and leakages are controlled.

Internationally, however, I do not see sufficient indications to say that the diesel market will quickly return to normal conditions. Attacks on Russian refineries continue, Russian restrictions on fuel exports remain in place, refining capacity in parts of the Middle East is still affected, and global inventories of diesel and middle distillates remain relatively low.

Therefore, Libya may continue to face a difficult and costly import market over the coming months, even if domestic conditions improve.

This makes it misguided to address the problem with the logic of: “Tell the NOC to buy more diesel and the problem is solved.”

A deeper solution requires, in parallel, increasing gas supplies to power plants whenever possible, improving the efficiency of local refineries, maintaining an adequate strategic reserve, improving shipment scheduling, linking storage facilities and distribution to an accurate tracking system, strengthening oversight against leakage and smuggling, and addressing the subsidy system carefully in a way that protects citizens without creating social shocks.

Conclusion

I believe we have a duty to be fair to citizens and to the sector’s institutions at the same time.

Yes, citizens are struggling to obtain diesel, and this is a genuine problem that should not be minimized.

But at the same time, the figures do not indicate that the National Oil Corporation and Brega have stopped fulfilling their role in supplying the market with fuel. Rather, they show that more than 625,000 tons of diesel were received in a single month, with nearly 82% secured from abroad, during one of the most difficult periods in the global diesel market.

Therefore, objective support for the NOC and Brega does not require rhetorical statements; it requires presenting these facts to the public.

The problem today is bigger than a fuel tanker and bigger than a storage facility. It lies at the intersection of the international market, electricity and gas, domestic distribution, subsidies, oversight, smuggling, and demand management.

The question I believe is more useful for the state and the citizen is not:

“Why did the NOC fail to provide diesel?”

But rather:

“If these large quantities are being secured, received, and distributed, how can we ensure that every liter reaches its intended destination, at the right time, and at the official price?”

When we can answer this question using daily figures rather than impressions, we will have truly begun addressing the diesel crisis at its roots.