{"id":258165,"date":"2026-08-16T23:54:04","date_gmt":"2026-08-16T21:54:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sada.ly\/en\/?p=258165"},"modified":"2026-08-16T23:54:08","modified_gmt":"2026-08-16T21:54:08","slug":"al-farisi-writes-the-art-of-monetary-pragmatism-managing-monetary-crises-between-the-absence-of-idealism-and-the-imperative-of-rescue","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sada.ly\/en\/al-farisi-writes-the-art-of-monetary-pragmatism-managing-monetary-crises-between-the-absence-of-idealism-and-the-imperative-of-rescue\/","title":{"rendered":"Al-Farisi Writes: The Art of Monetary Pragmatism\u2026 Managing Monetary Crises Between the Absence of Idealism and the Imperative of Rescue"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
A member of the Monetary Policy Committee at the Central Bank of Libya published a post in which he wrote:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Art of Monetary Pragmatism\u2026 Managing Monetary Crises Between the Absence of Idealism and the Imperative of Rescue\u2026 For the Record, from the Corridors of Monetary Policy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps it is unfortunate to be a member of the Monetary Policy Committee or an official at the Central Bank of Libya under these adverse and difficult circumstances. The responsibility becomes even greater when the task shifts from formulating stable monetary policy to a much greater national duty linked to the future of the economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When discussions focus on the decline in the purchasing power of the Libyan dinar and its exchange rate, traditional economic literature imposes its commonly used concepts on a reality that resembles them in no way. The Central Bank is urged to exercise \u201cmonetary dominance\u201d or use conventional monetary tools to control the financial situation, while completely ignoring the complex and almost impossible environment in which monetary policy operates in Libya. This environment combines institutional division, near-total external exposure, and legislation that restricts the use of monetary policy instruments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite this narrow room for maneuver, the Central Bank\u2019s extraordinary interventions have been the last line of defense preventing a plunge into the abyss and have averted scenarios of runaway inflation that could have devastated the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here, I will outline the situation for the general public so they can understand where monetary policy stands in relation to the economic crisis, highlighting only the most important obstacles:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Monetary policy in Libya does not operate within a deep financial market, nor does it have the luxury of raising interest rates to absorb liquidity due to strict legislative restrictions, namely Law No. 1 of 2013 concerning the prohibition of usurious transactions. Nor does Libya have an active treasury-bill market. Islamic financing instruments have not been effectively activated so that they can be properly assessed, due to resistance to change without consideration for the interests of the banking sector. In addition, Libya has the characteristics of a rentier economy that relies on oil exports for more than 90% of its revenues, with these exports repeatedly threatened by shutdowns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The catastrophic impact that was avoided:<\/strong> Had the Central Bank not resorted to extraordinary and unconventional tools to manage liquidity and set ceilings and allocations for foreign currency supply, the economy would have entered a vicious cycle of uncontrolled money printing to meet demand, ultimately resulting in a complete and sudden collapse of the exchange rate, similar to the experiences of countries that have suffered hyperinflation, where the local currency loses all purchasing and exchange value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Financial obligations and massive public banking debt accumulated as a result of years of division and emergency financial arrangements. The greatest risk lay in how these obligations would be handled and how their effects would be transferred to the monetary market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The catastrophic impact that was avoided:<\/strong> Had the Central Bank not absorbed these pressures through gradual monetary and accounting measures, and had it not resisted calls to monetize these debts all at once by converting them into liquid cash in the hands of the banking sector or currency holders, the parallel market would have faced a massive monetary explosion in M1, multiplying the dollar\u2019s price several times over within a very short period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a productionally closed economy where domestic alternatives for production inputs are absent, any government spending\u2014whether current spending such as wages or development spending such as projects\u2014immediately turns, through the \u201cmultiplier effect,\u201d into intensive demand for foreign currency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The catastrophic impact that was avoided:<\/strong> Had the Central Bank left financing requests and letters of credit open without controls or trade and monetary restrictions aligned with actual oil revenues, official foreign exchange reserves would have been completely depleted within a few years. Managing import requests within the minimum available limits prevented the depletion of external assets and preserved a strategic reserve to protect essential food and medicine imports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Amid rumors, unclear data, and fluctuating oil revenues, individuals and companies turning to the dollar to preserve value becomes a rational behavior for protection against uncertainty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The catastrophic impact that was avoided:<\/strong> Had the Central Bank not continued its organized and stable provision of foreign currency through official sales and electronic systems for individuals and companies, even during periods of sharply declining revenues, behavioral panic would have completely taken over the streets. Such panic could have triggered a bank run and a mass flight from the dinar, pushing the parallel-market exchange rate to uncontrollable record levels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The monetary landscape witnessed the entry of huge amounts of unauthorized cash, or parallel-printed currency, into circulation outside the official banking system. This posed a direct threat to monetary sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The catastrophic impact that was avoided:<\/strong> Had the Central Bank not intervened by taking firm and rapid decisions to withdraw certain denominations, such as the 50-dinar note, and restrict the movement of these monetary blocs, this unidentified, uncovered money would have flowed into the parallel currency market and been used in large-scale speculative operations that could have destabilized the markets and deprived the Central Bank of any ability to accurately determine the actual money supply.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the record, extensive meetings were held with the IMF\u2019s Middle East Technical Assistance Center (METAC) to provide technical support regarding the Libyan situation. I attended these meetings, convinced that the Libyan expert is far better equipped to understand the complex realities of the Libyan economy. However, the experts were struck by a state of shock and astonishment at the lack of opportunities for conventional intervention. Some of them were former senior officials at European central banks, and they were surprised that the situation was not as dire as the catastrophic indicators would suggest, although it remains a difficult situation nonetheless.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Assessing the performance of monetary policy in Libya according to the standards of countries with stable conditions is scientifically and practically unfair. With all the available options being difficult and the absence of comprehensive fiscal discipline, monetary policy was not searching for ideal solutions that do not exist. Rather, it was engaged in a daily battle to \u201cmanage the crisis\u201d and minimize the damage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thanks to these extraordinary measures, within their limited scope, the Libyan economy has remained relatively resilient, and the state has avoided a scenario of comprehensive financial collapse that would have completely wiped out citizens\u2019 purchasing power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I am not saying that the Central Bank did not make some mistakes, but it was always working to prevent collapse. Even operating in a stable environment involves some shortcomings, let alone operating in Libya\u2019s crisis-ridden environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unfortunately, the environment continues to create more obstacles for monetary policy, and unfortunately, the Central Bank will continue its efforts to prevent an even worse outcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the title of this article stated at the beginning, its concluding title is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMonetary Policy in Libya\u2026 A Battle to Avert the Worst, Not to Create the Ideal.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" A member of the Monetary Policy Committee at the Central Bank of Libya published a post in which he wrote: The Art of Monetary Pragmatism\u2026 Managing Monetary Crises Between the Absence of Idealism and the Imperative of Rescue\u2026 For the Record, from the Corridors of Monetary Policy Perhaps it is unfortunate to be a member […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":258132,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"iawp_total_views":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[613],"class_list":["post-258165","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news","tag-libya"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n1. A legally and structurally constrained environment: The illusion of conventional tools<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
2. Public banking debt: Containing the accounting dispute from flooding the market<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
3. Curbing excessive import demand: Pressure from development and current spending<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
4. Rational hedging and management of behavioral expectations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
5. The decisive confrontation with parallel monetary blocs (unauthorized banknotes)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n