Written by: Researcher in oil and economic affairs, Ahmed Al-Mesalleti
It is important to distinguish between presenting figures and interpreting them, as confusing the two leads to conclusions that may seem logical but remain incomplete.
The figure of $900 million, despite its magnitude, should not be viewed in isolation from the fact that Libya is a net fuel importer. This spending is linked to demand levels, global market prices, and the needs of the electricity sector, which consumes a significant portion of these quantities.
An average of 32–37 million liters per day does not reflect only citizens’ consumption but total national usage, including electricity, transport, industry, as well as losses. Treating this figure as “illicit consumption” is an oversimplification.
What is described as “barter” is not outside the economic framework, but rather a shift in the financing mechanism—from coverage through the Central Bank to the use of a portion of oil revenues before transfer. This is an accounting arrangement (offsetting), not a loss of funds.
The reference to halting the allocation of $345 million per month does not mean the absence of funding, but rather its shift to a different channel within the same financial cycle, which explains the continuation of imports.
The 2% increase in imports during the first quarter of 2026 remains within a normal margin and may reflect operational factors such as seasonal demand or electricity needs. It cannot be considered sufficient evidence of a lack of progress.
What has been presented highlights important figures but confuses cost, financing, and consumption, reducing the crisis to its financial dimension while overlooking its technical and structural aspects.
