Skip to main content

Author: Amira Cherni

Al-Zantouti: “After Today’s Dinar Devaluation – What’s Next, and Is This the End!?”

Financial Analyst Khaled Al-Zantouti wrote an article saying:
Today, our Central Bank came out with a decision to devalue the exchange rate by 13.3% (and I don’t know why the decimal is over 13 — is it the result of accurate calculations based on a fair pricing model for the dinar (I hope so), or is it a stroke of bad luck within a “hit or miss” framework?). In truth, the devaluation may exceed 16% if we take into account the increase in the tax amount as well.

This decision and its context are not surprising — it was expected from the Central Bank, as it has no other solutions under a miserable legacy and a bitter reality. And for that, it is excused — perhaps this is its way of showing the truth as it is. But the big question remains: Is this the end, or are there more endings to come?

We hope this is the end, but unfortunately, the data and figures presented by the Central Bank today suggest otherwise.
When the dollar spending deficit reaches around 50%, and when public debt hits 330 billion dinars, exceeding 130% of GDP, and this debt is consumptive, plagued by corruption and the corrupt… and when the per capita share of public debt reaches about 45,000 dinars (while less than two years ago it was 30,000 dinars), that means a yearly increase of about 25%, and when public spending reaches unprecedented levels, and salaries hit 75 billion, and the two governments continue in suspicious consumptive spending, and when, and when, and when… etc.

And when both legislators and executives insist on creating conflict and division, strengthening fragmentation to stay in power, fighting over shared wealth — with corrupt, corrupting hands, backed by power, dirty money, smuggling, mismanagement, regionalism, and quotas — and I don’t generalize…

Then what do you expect — is this the end?

Unfortunately, if we continue on this path, we’re heading toward the mother of all ends.
After this official devaluation of the dinar, traders will exploit the situation and raise their prices by much more than the devaluation percentage — some may raise prices by 25% or more. We’ll see!

They will ignore the fact that their letters of credit were opened at the old rate, and their warehouses are full of goods that have been stocked for a while. They were prepared — they knew in advance this devaluation was coming!
I don’t mean to generalize — maybe there are those who are honest with God and themselves.

The solution isn’t just in unifying the general budget. It goes much deeper — to treating the underlying causes of this unreasonable consumptive spending, to treating the corruption and mismanagement that made us among the world’s most infamous corrupt nations.

It means addressing our regional divisions, our “my share–your share” mentality. It means restructuring our economic and administrative systems with scientific, objective methods, and Libyan national spirit — even without any (pan-Arab) zeal, or Septemberist, or Februaryist affiliations.
We are all children of Libya. Libya is the homeland and the refuge.

If there is will and sincerity with God and the nation, the solutions are obvious, and we can all — I repeat, all — solve our economic, political, and social problems.
Just a bit of integrity, and remember the words of the Almighty:

“Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves. And when Allah intends for a people ill, there is no repelling it. And there is not for them besides Him any patron.”
[Surah Ar-Ra’d, 13:11]
True are the words of God Almighty.

Exclusive: Al-Bouri to Sada: “The Dinar Devaluation Won’t Be the Last if Government Deficit Financing Continues”

Banking expert Naaman Al-Bouri spoke exclusively to our source regarding the Central Bank’s latest statement, saying:
“The statement issued today by the Central Bank of Libya shows that the bank is facing a difficult and complex situation.”

He added:
“Excessive public spending by two governments, along with resorting to deficit financing during Q4 of 2024 and Q1 of 2025, coinciding with the decline in oil and sovereign revenues, all pushed the Central Bank to make the decision to devalue the exchange rate.”

He continued:
“The key question now is: Can the Central Bank refuse to continue financing the deficit until a unified budget and austerity-based fiscal policies are implemented?”

He further stated:
“Unfortunately, the absence of the interest rate—as one of the most important monetary policy tools—has forced the Central Bank to use the exchange rate as its only tool, which poses serious economic risks.”

Al-Bouri stressed:
“The Central Bank must insist on its commitment not to finance any government through deficit spending. Government funding must be directly tied to state income from oil and other sources. Chapter II of the budget must be strictly linked to actual state revenues.”

He emphasized:
“If the Central Bank cannot stop deficit financing, then today’s decision to devalue the dinar will not be the last one this year.”

He concluded:
“Deficit financing means creating a new money supply, and every new dinar created will seek to convert into dollars, further exacerbating the exchange rate crisis. Therefore, all off-budget government financing must immediately stop. The legislative authorities must take historic responsibility to unify the government and adopt a single budget that does not exceed state revenues. The current situation requires a collective effort from all sides.”

Al-Shaibi: “The Central Bank Cannot Alone Face the Imminent Challenges… and These Are the Solutions After the Exchange Rate Adjustment”

Banking expert Imran Al-Shaibi wrote an article on his official page commenting on the statement issued by the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya.

Main Economic Challenges

1. Dual Spending
One of the most prominent challenges facing the Libyan economy amid political division is dual spending. The total dual spending by the two governments reached 224 billion Libyan dinars in one year:

  • 123 billion from the Government of National Unity
  • 59 billion from the Libyan Government
  • 42 billion from oil swaps
    This situation reflects weak coordination between political parties and increases financial pressure on the state.

2. Revenue-Expenditure Gap
Only 136 billion dinars in revenues were recorded, indicating a massive funding gap compared to total spending of 36 billion USD. This imbalance created a high demand for foreign currency, exacerbating pressure on currency reserves and the exchange rate.

3. Weak Oil Revenues Deposited into the Central Bank
Only 18.6 billion USD was deposited, while expenditures reached 27 billion USD, creating a supply-demand gap of around 8.4 billion USD.

Negative Effects of the Current Situation

  • Increased Money Supply: Reached 178.1 billion dinars due to the expansion in dual spending, causing inflation and reducing citizens’ purchasing power.
  • Exchange Rate Pressure: Eroded local and international confidence in the Libyan economy and led to increased inflation.
  • Public Debt Surge: Reached record levels of 270 billion dinars, distributed as:
    • 84 billion with the Central Bank in Tripoli
    • 186 billion with the Central Bank in Benghazi
  • If the current situation persists, public debt is expected to hit 330 billion dinars by the end of 2025, especially without a unified budget.

Status in Q1 2025

Total dollar expenditures reached 9.8 billion USD, distributed as:

  • 4.4 billion USD for credits and transfers
  • 4.4 billion USD for trade and personal use cards
  • 1 billion USD for government expenditures

This spending pattern shows a high demand for foreign currency, further pressuring reserves.

Oil revenue shortfall: Only 5.2 billion USD collected until March 27, indicating a deficit of 4.6 billion USD in the first quarter of the year.

Key Contributing Factors to the Crisis

  • Governmental and Institutional Division: Absence of a unified economic vision and conflicting decisions, further complicating the economic landscape.
  • Ongoing Smuggling of Goods and Fuel: Raised import demand, draining foreign currency reserves.
  • Foreign Labor and Illegal Immigration: Drain approximately 7 billion USD annually, adding a heavy burden on the economy.
  • Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in the Parallel Market: Pose serious security and economic threats, destabilizing the financial system.
  • Lack of Monetary Tools: The Central Bank lacks instruments like interest rates to curb inflation or absorb excess money supply.

What’s the Solution?

  • Adjusting the Exchange Rate: To create balance in economic sectors, while considering its inflationary impact.
  • Using Part of the Reserves Temporarily: Could help stabilize the exchange rate, but must be done cautiously to avoid depletion.
  • Unifying Legislative and Executive Authorities: To end political and institutional division, improving financial resource management.
  • Developing a Short-Term Economic Vision: Including a unified budget to control public spending and restore financial balance.
  • Appealing to the Judiciary and Ministry of Interior: To take firm, deterrent actions against goods smuggling and currency speculation.

The Bitter Truth

The bitter truth that no one talks about is that Libya has been divided for 15 years, despite pretenses and lies claiming the state is united (in name, flag, and anthem only).
The situation cannot continue for another year, and the Central Bank cannot face the coming challenges alone.

We are now closer to the situation of North and South Korea—sharing a name, yet each has its own authority, army, financial and technical institutions, and governance.

We must stop sugar-coating the situation and playing on emotions. We must take decisions that could be in favor of the state if we achieve real unification of state institutions—or else face a tragic future, should the division continue, with its inevitable result being a bloody confrontation no one desires.

Ibrahim Wali: “The Decline of the Dinar’s Exchange Rate and the Fall in Oil Prices”

The economic expert Ibrahim Wali wrote the following article: In this post, I was going to speak about the role of domestic public debt, amounting to (200) billion Libyan dinars, and its role in Libya’s economic life as a tool of fiscal policy and as a means to cover the deficit in the general budget, amidst declining public revenues — whether oil or tax revenues — to face public expenditures, especially developmental and investment expenditures that help raise the living standard of the Libyan citizen, through financial and economic policies and plans adopted for this purpose.
However, my pen unintentionally led me to the same old-new problem that refuses to leave us — unless those who caused and carried it out leave — and that is the issue of the deterioration of the national currency’s exchange rate against the dollar and the sharp decline in oil prices.

  • The main problem lies in the significant gap between the official exchange rate of the dollar and the parallel market rate. As long as this gap exists, it encourages the presence of speculative traders, who — according to economic experts — are essentially supporting the parallel market, the sworn enemy of the Central Bank. (Have you ever seen someone funding his own enemy?) As a result, the Central Bank cannot defend the national currency, and it remains stockpiled on worthless carts as if it were produce in a vegetable market, right under the Central Bank’s walls.
    And how could it not be, when a speculator obtains a $10,000 card in the morning from the Central Bank, then sells it on the parallel market in the evening for a profit of 7% to 8%? If this operation is repeated ten times, the profit soars to 300%! Some even get more than 50 cards — so imagine their profit from this process.

Despite the fact that the Central Bank of Libya has recently opened many letters of credit and is currently issuing funds via personal use cards, etc., the dollar exchange rate has surpassed 7 dinars, and will reach 10 dinars if this miserable situation continues. The Central Bank has adopted these erroneous policies, assuming they would raise the value of the Libyan dinar against the dollar.

Thus, the large gap between the official and parallel exchange rates is what led to the emergence of currency speculators, opening wide doors to corruption, smuggling, and theft.

These flawed policies, adopted by successive governments, have resulted in failure and mismanagement of spending, along with widespread theft and smuggling. All these negative outcomes have created imbalances in all policies — political, economic, monetary, and fiscal.

For example: in 2010, salary expenditures ranged between 8 to 9 billion, and then rose to 25 billion, and today they amount to 65 billion.

Let’s look at the size of general budgets:
In 2017, the largest budget in Libya’s history was 70 billion dinars, which caused a media uproar, and the dollar’s exchange rate then hit 10 dinars.
In 2018, when fees were imposed on foreign currency, it was a positive move for the government and helped solve a large part of the issues we suffered from between 2015–2019 — the lean years when we had no liquidity, failed to pay salaries for more than 7 months, and paid out children’s allowances, spousal support, and girls’ bonuses through temporary patchwork solutions.

By 2023, we were talking about a general budget of 125 billion dinars in public spending, 84% of which was consumption expenditure — another serious issue brought upon us by this government.

And today, in April 2025, what I warned about in my post dated 19/2/2024 has come true — and here is the exact quote:
“I warn this government, the House of Representatives, and the Central Bank of Libya: if these flawed policies continue, Libya will witness a serious and real deficit when the price of oil drops below $72 per barrel — and this is not just my opinion, but that of many experts in the field.”

Now, this month, there has been a sharp drop in oil prices, with Brent crude falling to $66 per barrel, its lowest level in years, due to the trade war led by the United States and other global tensions.

Accordingly, we must prepare for this year, 2025, to face this potential deficit or — God forbid — economic collapse, amid the absence of monetary and fiscal policies and accompanying reforms.

Monetary and fiscal policies cannot succeed without parallel development in infrastructure, investment, establishment of small and medium enterprises, activation of sovereign institutions, and more. I spoke about this in my post titled “The Libyan Economic Crisis and How to Overcome It” dated 28/11/2024 for those who wish to review it.

We urgently need a unified Prime Minister across all of Libya, who has a wise mindset, loyal first to God and to the nation, belongs to all Libyans, is up to the responsibility, includes experts from all fields, and — as the saying goes — gives “the bread to the baker.” We need clear and continuous reforms, amending the legal status of the Central Bank of Libya, reforming the banking sector, separating authorities and responsibilities (monetary, financial, commercial), opening interbank clearing — in addition to accompanying reforms that are essential to improving the lives of ordinary Libyans and their standard of living. These include granting loans to establish small and medium enterprises and issuing all types of loans — real estate, agricultural, and industrial — which would help absorb unemployment, currently at around 40% in Libya.

Only then will the Libyan dinar regain its strength and standing as a national currency, hopefully returning to its true equilibrium value.

These potential positive effects also include increased government revenues, reduced budget deficits, and enhanced participation.

Exclusive: Including $2,000 Personal Use Cards – Central Bank Issues New Regulations for Foreign Currency Sales

Our source has exclusively obtained the new regulations for foreign currency sales issued by the Department of Currency and Banking Supervision at the Central Bank of Libya.

The new rules stipulate the following caps:

  • Commercial letters of credit: A maximum of $3 million USD (or equivalent in other currencies).
  • Service-related transactions: A maximum of $1 million USD.
  • Industrial imports: A maximum of $5 million USD.

For companies, small traders, and artisans, the maximum prepaid card amount for industrial, service, and commercial purposes is set at $50,000 USD.

Personal use:
Banks are authorized to approve foreign currency sales for personal purposes using the national ID number for every Libyan citizen aged 18 years and above, upon completing the required procedures via the foreign currency reservation platform for personal use across all operating banks in Libya. The maximum annual amount is $2,000 USD, or its equivalent in other currencies.

For students studying abroad, banks are allowed to sell foreign currency up to $7,500 USD per student annually.

For medical treatment abroad, the maximum allowed amount is $10,000 USD per person.

Additionally, the maximum amount per single transfer is capped at $1 million USD, or its equivalent in other currencies.

The Central Bank Takes Measures to Adjust the Exchange Rate… Lists the Reasons and Issues Numerical Warnings

The Governor of the Central Bank of Libya issued a statement today, Sunday, regarding the Bank’s decision to adopt a series of strict measures, including a reconsideration of the exchange rate, in order to create balance in the economic sectors amid the lack of hope or prospects for unifying the dual government spending.

The Governor revealed that the volume of dual public spending during 2024 reached 224 billion Libyan dinars, including 123 billion in expenditures by the Government of National Unity, 42 billion in oil swaps, and about 59 billion in spending by the eastern-based Libyan government. This was matched by oil and tax revenues totaling 136 billion dinars. This level of spending created a demand for foreign currency amounting to $36 billion.

He continued: The expansion in dual public spending over the past years, and particularly in 2024, has led to a sharp increase in the money supply, which has reached 178.1 billion dinars. This is expected to result in several negative economic effects and poses serious challenges to the Bank due to the limited tools available to contain it. It will also create further demand for foreign currency, continued pressure on the Libyan dinar exchange rate in the parallel market, higher inflation rates, and risks to the public’s trust in the local currency.

He added that foreign currency revenues from oil exports deposited at the Central Bank amounted to only $18.6 billion in 2024, while expenditures in foreign currency reached $27 billion, leading to a significant gap between the demand for foreign currency and what is available. This has made it difficult for the Central Bank to define a clear exchange rate policy due to the increasing demand for foreign currency and the expansion of dual public spending.

He stated that if decisions to spend continue to be issued based on the 1/12 monthly budget formula in 2025 by both governments, and public spending continues at the same pace as in 2024, reaching 224 billion dinars, it will worsen the financial and economic situation of the country. This will present new challenges for the Central Bank, increase the demand for foreign currency, exacerbate deficits in the balance of payments and the general budget, and lead to a growing public debt.

He pointed out that data from the first quarter of 2025 clearly show the continuation of dual public spending, deficit financing, and increased demand for foreign currency, while oil revenues remain insufficient to cover the gap—something he described as dangerous. Foreign currency expenditures in Q1 amounted to around $9.8 billion (including $4.4 billion in letters of credit and transfers, $4.4 billion via business and personal-use cards, and $1 billion in government spending), equivalent to 55 billion dinars. Meanwhile, oil revenues and royalties deposited in the Central Bank amounted to only $5.2 billion by March 27, resulting in a deficit of about $4.6 billion in just three months. The situation could become even more critical if oil production or export levels decline due to any variable, or if global oil prices drop.

He added that the expansion of public spending, resulting from various decisions and laws, has increased the public debt held by the Central Bank in both Tripoli and Benghazi, reaching around 270 billion dinars—84 billion in Tripoli and approximately 186 billion in Benghazi. The total public debt is expected to exceed 330 billion dinars by the end of 2025 in the absence of a unified budget and with spending continuing at the 2024 rate. This is an extremely serious and unsustainable indicator and will cause major distortions in macroeconomic indicators.

He continued: To reduce the gap between supply and demand for foreign currency and the balance of payments deficit, the Bank was forced to use part of its foreign currency reserves temporarily to maintain exchange rate stability at acceptable levels, in order to preserve the prices of goods and services, and limit runaway inflation and the erosion of purchasing power. However, reliance on reserves is unsustainable. Therefore, the Central Bank had no choice but to reconsider foreign exchange regulations and the exchange rate in order to contain the consequences of unrestrained public spending and the absence of effective, goal-oriented macroeconomic policies.

The Central Bank affirmed that it continues to fulfill its duties in maintaining foreign assets at levels exceeding $94 billion, including $84 billion in reserves managed by the Bank, despite the significant challenges and the risky environment in which it operates.

It also noted that the inability to combat and curb the smuggling of goods and fuel has worsened the crisis by increasing the demand for imports and draining the foreign currency available to the Central Bank. Furthermore, the growing number of unregistered foreign workers and illegal migrants—estimated to cost around $7 billion annually—has increased the consumption of goods and demand for foreign currency in the parallel market, which has become a source of funding for illicit activities, money laundering, and terrorism financing.

Exclusive: Shriha Responds to Husni Bey’s Statements – “Subsidy Replacement Won’t Change Anything, It Will Only Increase the Burden on Libyans Right Now”

Oil expert Masoud Shriha commented in a statement to our source on the remarks made by Libyan businessman Husni Bey regarding the replacement of subsidies, saying: “Replacing subsidies will not change the economic situation — it will only increase the burden on Libyans at this time.”

He said: “According to the Central Bank’s report, revenues from fuel sales amounted to only 154 million Libyan dinars for 2024, while the Central Bank was supposed to receive around 2.8 billion LYD — meaning it only received 5% of fuel revenues. The question that arises is: where did the other 95% of the fuel revenues go?”

He continued: “In the event that subsidies are replaced, the situation will remain unchanged simply because the revenues won’t reach the Central Bank. Therefore, replacing the subsidies will only increase the burden on both the people and the Central Bank.”

He added that the current head of the National Oil Corporation is completely incapable of managing oil marketing, which is clearly evident in his public statements — a fact that all Libyans seem to agree on. He emphasized that the credibility of OPEC, Central Bank, and other local and international reports should not be questioned by any institution that lacks transparency and operates on the basis of regionalism and tribal favoritism rather than equal opportunity.

With His Prior Warning in Mind.. Eshnibish Calls to Lower Oil Prices Could Lead to a Severe Crisis for the Libyan Economy in 2025

Back in January, Professor Anas Eshnibish warned in a statement to our source that the increasing calls to lower oil prices — including direct appeals to the OPEC organization by one of the world’s largest oil-producing countries — could lead to a severe crisis for the Libyan economy in 2025.

He stated:
“Over the past few days, there has been news of calls to reduce global oil prices, and even a direct message was sent to OPEC by the president of a country with the highest oil production rate in the world. If such measures are implemented with the urgency we’ve seen, they would have the harshest impact on the Libyan economy and financial situation in general during 2025.”

He further explained the direct implications:
“In a country dependent on a rentier economy based on oil, and suffering from consecutive economic crises and budget deficits for years, a drop in oil prices will significantly and directly affect Libya’s economic situation due to its heavy reliance on oil revenues as the main source of public income.”

He clarified that the potential consequences include a decline in government revenues, a widened budget deficit, a drop in foreign currency reserves — which could pressure the exchange rate of the Libyan dinar — as well as social repercussions such as rising unemployment and stagnation in development projects.

Today, with the sharp decline in oil prices recorded in April, we find ourselves facing the actual realization of that prediction. Brent crude fell below $66 per barrel, its lowest level in years, impacted by global trade tensions and increased supply from the “OPEC+” alliance.

What the Libyan economy is currently experiencing is not surprising. Rather, it is a logical result of accumulated rentier policies and an overreliance on a single source of income without genuine diversification in the production base. Under such pressure, delaying reforms is no longer an option.

Among the key solutions Eshneibesh proposed at the time were: economic diversification, reducing public spending, supporting the private sector, investing in renewable energy, enhancing transparency, and improving the management of foreign currency — all of which remain viable solutions if there is political will and societal awareness.

Ultimately, the decline in oil prices is not merely a temporary crisis but a real test of Libya’s ability to transition from dependence to independence, and from consumption to production.

Al-Shhoumi Writes: “The Use of the Dollar as a Weapon, Imposing Tariffs, and Their Impact on the Future of American Hegemony”

The investment expert and capital fund manager in the United Kingdom, Mondher Al-Shhoumi, wrote an article titled: “The Use of the Dollar as a Weapon, Imposing Tariffs, and Their Impact on the Future of American Hegemony.

For decades, the United States has been the cornerstone of the global economic system, benefiting from the dominance of the US dollar and its leadership in the multilateral trading system. However, in recent years, it has begun to wield its economic power as a geopolitical weapon in unprecedented ways — from freezing foreign currency reserves of adversaries to imposing punitive tariffs on both trade partners and foes alike. These moves have highlighted the extent of American influence, but they have also raised serious questions about their long-term consequences. Could using the dollar as a weapon, along with a growing inclination toward tariffs, undermine the very foundations of American global dominance that Washington laid after World War II?

The Dollar as a Weapon

Since the end of World War II, the US dollar has been the dominant global currency in trade and finance. Today, it accounts for around 60% of the declared foreign currency reserves held by central banks worldwide, despite the US economy making up only about a quarter of global output. The dollar is involved in nearly 90% of all foreign exchange transactions globally, making it the preferred and trusted medium for trade and finance. This unique position has given the US what economists call an “exorbitant privilege” — the ability to borrow and spend internationally in its own currency with relatively low risk, along with massive political and economic influence thanks to its access to the global financial system.

However, the US has recently begun to use this financial strength as leverage to achieve foreign policy goals. This was starkly demonstrated by the freezing of Russia’s foreign reserves abroad in 2022 — the boldest use of the dollar as a weapon to date. Around $300 billion of Russia’s reserves were blocked in response to its war on Ukraine, alongside similar — though smaller — actions previously taken against Iran, Libya, Venezuela, and Afghanistan. From Washington’s perspective, these financial sanctions are powerful tools to punish adversaries and deter defiance. But for other nations, this trend sends an alarming signal: if America can paralyze any country’s access to the dollar and the financial system, is it safe to keep depending so heavily on the US currency?

This question has accelerated the global debate around de-dollarization. After Russia’s reserves were frozen, even some US allies realized they could be vulnerable if their policies diverged from Washington’s. As a result, multiple international actors began seeking alternatives. For example, China and Russia have increased trade in their national currencies. By mid-2024, about 27% of China’s foreign trade was denominated in the renminbi (yuan), up from just 17% in early 2022 — largely because China and its ally Russia began settling their bilateral trade in yuan instead of dollars.

In Europe, concerns about US dominance in payment systems have sparked local alternatives. The European Central Bank has warned about the risk of “economic pressure and coercion” due to American card networks (like Visa and Mastercard) controlling most payments. This has driven efforts to launch a digital euro to boost Europe’s financial independence. While this project is still in development and likely years away from implementation, its mere proposal reflects a growing desire to build financial systems less dependent on the US.

Still, viable alternatives to the dollar remain limited in the near term. No other currency comes close to matching the dollar’s global role. For example, China’s yuan accounts for only around 2% of global reserves. Additionally, most major economies — including US allies like Japan and the EU — have participated in recent rounds of sanctions (such as those against Russia), meaning switching to those currencies doesn’t fully shield against Western sanctions. There’s also the matter of network effects: the more the dollar is used, the harder it is to replace, and the costlier it becomes to build a global alternative.

Thus, financial analysts emphasize that any substantial decline in the dollar’s dominance will take a long time. Despite increasing calls for reserve diversification, the foundations supporting the dollar remain deeply embedded in the global economic and financial structure. In other words, the dollar may be a double-edged sword for America: while its weaponization may gradually drive others to find ways around it, the dollar’s entrenched role still gives Washington wide strategic leeway that could last for decades.

Tariffs as a Weapon

In addition to its financial influence, the US also possesses significant trade power, which it has recently used through broad tariffs to achieve political and economic goals. Departing from its traditional support of free trade, Washington imposed unilateral tariffs on several countries and trade partners in the late 2010s. The most notable example was the trade war with China that began in 2018, when the US imposed 25% tariffs on roughly $250 billion worth of Chinese imports, later expanding the scope to include another $300 billion in goods. China retaliated with its own tariffs on American imports.

This became the biggest trade conflict in decades, disrupting global supply chains and shaking financial markets due to the uncertainty and added costs imposed on businesses and consumers.

Tariff policies didn’t stop at strategic adversaries like China. They also targeted traditional allies: the US imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the EU, Canada, and Mexico, citing security and trade concerns. This unilateral approach angered allies, who saw it as a betrayal of the multilateral trade system that the US had helped create. Some European countries considered retaliatory tariffs and even more drastic measures like restricting American banks operating in Europe. These escalatory steps were never implemented, partly due to Wall Street’s global clout and European fears of damaging their own economies. Still, the fact that allies even considered such defensive actions highlights the extent of the rift that tariff policies have caused in trust between the US and its partners.

Domestically, US proponents of tariffs argue they are necessary to protect jobs and industries from unfair competition and to counter trade practices seen as market-distorting (like IP theft or dumping). Some view tariffs as a negotiating tool to pressure rivals into concessions. However, most economists doubt that tariffs effectively achieve these stated goals. For instance, the US trade deficit did not shrink significantly as a result of the tariffs, as it is shaped more by structural factors in the US economy (like savings and investment gaps) than by tariffs alone.

Experts warn that protectionist barriers could backfire. If tariffs fail to reduce the trade deficit — a scenario many economists see as likely — they could harm the US economy without achieving their purpose. Indeed, after tariffs were imposed, the US saw an increase in import costs for average consumers, effectively acting as a hidden tax on household spending. American companies that rely on imported components also faced pressure to raise prices or accept lower profit margins.

Moreover, confrontational tariffs could have long-term geopolitical consequences. Overusing protectionist tools risks weakening America’s leadership in shaping global trade rules. When the US bypasses institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and enforces unilateral measures, other countries may lose confidence in the international trade system and look for alternative arrangements. This is already happening, with some nations forming massive regional trade agreements that exclude the US, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which moved forward without Washington’s participation. As US influence in trade agenda-setting declines, other countries are stepping in to fill the gap and steer globalization in ways that suit their interests.

Implications for the Future of American Hegemony

Recent US actions reflect a blend of power projection and strategic gambling with the fruits of its dominance. On one hand, Washington has demonstrated its influence by showing it can twist the arm of even a major economy by denying access to dollars and American markets. On the other hand, these policies have raised the specter of global mistrust in US leadership. American hegemony since WWII has relied not just on hard power, but also on a vast network of alliances and the willingness of other nations — even allies — to accept the US as the guarantor of an open global economic system. If those countries begin to view the US as a player willing to weaponize the rules of the system against them during disputes, they will naturally seek to reduce their exposure to financial and trade dominance.

In the short term, this dissatisfaction may not lead to an immediate collapse of the dollar’s status or the unraveling of trade alliances. The US still holds a uniquely unmatched position for now…

Abu Snina: “On the United States Imposing Tariffs on Imports from Various Countries, Including Libya”

Written by: Economic expert Mohamed Abu Snina.

The United States of America is considered one of the largest economies dependent on the outside world. When you walk through American markets, it is rare to find a product made in America—especially consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, furniture, jewelry, technological products, and alcoholic beverages. Instead, you find all types of imported products from various countries, including European Union states, Southeast Asian nations, Mexico, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Middle Eastern countries, and even some Sub-Saharan African countries.

This means that the United States heavily relies on imports from abroad, and the trade balance is always not in its favor, even though the size of the American economy represents about 26% of the global economy. This situation is due to purely economic reasons.

Nonetheless, the United States surprised the world by imposing tariffs ranging from 10% to 50% on imports from over 200 countries.

The overall trade surplus of countries exporting to the United States—or in other words, the trade deficit of the U.S.—is due to the comparative advantages enjoyed by these countries, resulting from the low cost and high quality of their products and their lower production costs, including cheaper labor, compared to the cost of producing alternatives within the United States.

As of early 2025, the U.S. trade deficit had reached approximately $103.5 billion (not speaking of the cumulative deficit), which raised concerns within the American administration, as the size of the deficit had reached an unprecedented level.

It is noteworthy that, in practice, to offset the U.S. trade deficit, the U.S. Treasury prints and injects an equivalent amount of dollars into global markets ($103.5 billion during 2024) as repayment of its foreign debt resulting from the trade deficit with various countries. This has been the U.S. mechanism throughout history since the dollar became the world’s reserve currency—enabling the U.S. dollar to dominate the global economy.

In other words, the United States is always in a state of deficit in dealing with the outside world so that the dominance of the dollar over the global economy can continue. The U.S. imports various goods and products from around the world and, in return, prints dollars (not backed by anything) and pays them to other countries. This means that any measures taken by the U.S. to reduce imports in an attempt to shrink the trade deficit will come at the expense of the power, position, spread, and dominance of the dollar over international payments.

This is something the American administration is currently trying to ignore, under the assumption that the global economy is still unprepared to abandon the dollar as a reserve currency or as a medium for settling international trade transactions, or to replace it with a new international currency—such as the digital yuan that China is promoting and pushing for adoption. This also applies to efforts by the BRICS group to propose a new international currency in response to the U.S. dollar, which has become a tool to politically and economically threaten nations.

From a technical economic perspective, it is unlikely that U.S. authorities are unaware that declaring a tariff war on various countries is a double-edged sword. Besides the responses of countries whose exports to the U.S. are now subject to high tariffs (in an attempt to reduce their entry into American markets—the protective effect targeted by the U.S. government), these countries will, in return, impose high tariffs on American products imported into their markets. This reduces their imports from the U.S., and consequently, the U.S.’s export revenue to these countries. Additionally, certain American industries and small economic activities—especially agriculture, which relies heavily on imported inputs—may suffer from rising costs, operational difficulties, and even shutdowns. This is the expected result of what is known as a trade war, which the current U.S. administration pays little attention to, as it focuses instead on large capital-intensive industries such as the automotive and defense sectors, and increasing the Treasury’s revenues.

The outcome of this trade war is that all parties will suffer damage without exception, although the severity will vary by country. For the United States, the expected consequences include a rise in imported goods prices in American markets, which will further fuel inflation and may push the economy into stagflation.

While these imposed tariffs may increase U.S. Treasury revenues from customs duties, they simultaneously lead to income redistribution in favor of the suppliers of these consumer goods—at the expense of American consumers’ surplus (the redistribution effect). This occurs when the tariffs are reflected in retail prices in U.S. markets, a move that may face strong opposition domestically.

This means that the U.S.’s ability to enforce its policies and dominate international trade is not unlimited. It is surrounded by a set of factors and risks that may threaten the reality and future of the U.S. economy and the dollar’s global standing.

Therefore, it is expected that the U.S. administration may backtrack on continuing this declared tariff war on the global economy, and the legislative authorities (Congress) may intervene to cancel it to prevent the U.S. economy from slipping into stagflation.

As for the expected impact on Libya—being one of the countries targeted by the U.S. tariffs on its exports to America—the main commodity Libya exports to the U.S. is crude oil. Some statistics indicate that the value of these exports was around $1.57 billion in 2024, and their relative importance does not exceed 10% of total exports in the best-case scenarios, and on average does not exceed 7% of total oil exports.

However, Libyan crude oil and gas exports will not be subject to the tariffs recently imposed by the Trump administration, as imports of oil, gas, and petroleum products were exempted from these tariffs for all countries—except those under U.S. sanctions. This reduces the importance of these measures’ impact on the Libyan economy.

In other words, given the exemption of oil exports from these tariffs and the low relative importance of Libya’s non-oil exports to the U.S. in the total exports—which may be subject to a 30% tariff—these U.S. tariffs will have negligible effects on Libya’s trade balance.

Moreover, any response by Libyan authorities—such as imposing high tariffs on U.S. imports (which constitute no more than 3% of Libya’s total imports)—will also have a minimal impact on the Libyan economy, apart from raising the prices of these products in the Libyan market.

The expected impact on the Libyan economy from the U.S. administration’s tariff measures against many countries—including the EU, China, Japan, Korea, and Turkey—will be indirect. It will come from the rising prices of goods produced in those countries, which Libya regularly imports, and whose exports to the U.S. are now subject to higher tariffs. These countries may also impose tariffs on American products they import, in retaliation—such as the EU, Libya’s largest trade partner.

Additionally, Libya may face disrupted supplies of goods, affecting the local market, given the country’s heavy reliance on imports to meet domestic needs.

Another possible effect is the depreciation of the U.S. dollar in financial markets due to declining demand for American products. This would negatively impact the value of Libya’s dollar-denominated assets, including Central Bank reserves.

Expectations of a global economic recession caused by this global trade war declared by the U.S. against China and many other economies—and the return to outdated mutual protectionist policies, despite the existence of the World Trade Organization and its agreements—will lead to lower global oil demand and falling oil prices. This is the most dangerous consequence for the Libyan economy and the one that requires the most attention and response.

On the Future of the Libyan Dinar.. Al-Jhimi: “Don’t Be Fooled by Revenues or Get Too Comfortable with Reserves.. These Are the Solutions”

Former Minister of Planning Taher Al-Jhimi wrote on his official Facebook page:

What is the future of the Libyan dinar’s value relative to the dollar?

This is the question many Libyans are asking these days. Some are asking with eagerness, and everyone is wondering: will the coming weeks and months witness a decline in the relative value of the dinar? When asking this big question, they are looking for a simple answer: yes or no. Of course, after yes or no, there are other questions.

Economists typically don’t give a clear or definitive answer because they are influenced by their study of probability theory, which requires in-depth analysis. Therefore, in this post, there’s no yes or no, but rather: this is more likely than that, especially when we’re talking about the medium or long term. However, in short, we can say that if the current conditions and trends persist, the future of the dinar’s value is not promising.

Don’t blame the Central Bank for your current situation. The Central Bank is just one hand, and one hand can’t clap. Instead, blame those who have put you in this uncertain political and economic reality.

Don’t let oil revenues deceive you into thinking they will save you. They have become almost a neutral factor. How is that? These revenues won’t rise much if they increase, nor will they fall much if they decrease, at least in the foreseeable future. Why? Because the oil giants (Saudi Arabia and the US) are committed to the “oil market stability” policy. It’s not in Saudi Arabia’s interest for oil prices to rise too much for political reasons, and it’s not in America’s interest for this to happen for economic reasons (the transfer of wealth abroad).

Similarly, it’s not in Saudi Arabia’s interest for oil prices to fall too much for budgetary reasons, and it’s not in America’s interest for this to happen because it harms the interests of influential American companies (as Kissinger said in the early 1970s). Also, don’t get too comfortable with the Central Bank’s reserves, which are abundant; no matter how large they grow, they can shrink rapidly.

The solution I see is comprehensive and full economic reform, involving the implementation of all state tools and institutions, especially the economic and financial institutions. Two points must be noted here:

First: neglecting the problem or postponing action on addressing it will only worsen the situation and make it harder to solve. Second: positive results from economic reform don’t come quickly; they take time, depending on the surrounding circumstances.

Am I optimistic? No, I’m cautiously optimistic. I have a bit of pessimism and a bit of optimism. Why? Because economic reform is a surgical and painful process, especially for the poor and middle-class social groups. Therefore, only strong, stable governments with powers, let’s say realistically, close to dictatorship, can manage it. Let’s see…

Exclusive: Source at the U.S.-Libya Meeting Reveals Full Details to Sada, Highlighting Exploration of Business Opportunities in Libya

Our source from within the U.S.-Libya meeting corridors revealed the details of the roundtable gathering of American and Libyan executive officials, stating that the attendees included Libyan and American political figures. However, the meeting is a regular annual event held by invitation from the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations (NCUSLR) and the American Chamber of Commerce.

He added that the topics discussed were public affairs, general opinions, and idea exchange, emphasizing that the meeting is unrelated to matters of the Libyan state or its legislative and executive authorities. All attendees represent only themselves and their personal views and ideas.

He further stated that the main topic of discussion was the exploration of business opportunities in Libya and the enhancement of the healthcare sector in the country.

Libya Among Them: U.S. Seeks New Destinations for Deported Migrants

A report by The Wall Street Journal, citing officials say they have asked several countries in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe

The Trump administration is pursuing agreements with several more countries to take migrants deported from the U.S., according to officials familiar with the matter. Immigration officials are seeking more destinations where they can send immigrants the U.S. wants to deport, but whose countries are slow to take them back or refuse to. Their desired model builds on a one-time deal the administration struck with Panama in February, under which they sent a planeload of over 100 migrants, mostly from the Middle East, to the Central American nation. Panama then detained the migrants and worked to send them to their home countries. The officials are in conversations with countries in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, but aren’t necessarily looking to sign formal agreements, the people said. What happens next to the deported migrants would depend on the specific host nation. The U.S. is agnostic, for example, whether the person would be permitted to ask for asylum or be deported to their own country, the people said. Among the countries the U.S. has asked to take the deportees are Libya, Rwanda, Benin, Eswatini, Moldova, Mongolia and Kosovo. The U.S. is hoping these nations will agree to the administration’s requests, perhaps in exchange for financial arrangements or the political benefit of helping President Trump accomplish one of his top domestic priorities. The administration is looking to certain Latin American countries to sign longer-term agreements designating them as safe places for migrants to ask for asylum instead of the U.S. Officials are close to finalizing such a deal with Honduras and are in negotiations with Costa Rica, according to a person familiar with the matter. None of the embassies for these countries immediately returned requests for comment. Stephen Miller addressing the media. Stephen Miller, White House deputy chief of staff, is spearheading the effort to find more countries willing to accept migrants the U.S. wants to deport.

In a statement, a State Department spokesperson didn’t address private diplomatic conversations but said “enforcing our nation’s immigration laws is critically important to the national security and public safety of the United States including ensuring the successful enforcement of final orders of removal.” State is working closely with the Department of Homeland Security “to enforce the Trump Administration’s immigration policies.” The White House and Department of Homeland Security didn’t respond to requests for comment. The negotiations are occurring as Trump, who campaigned on launching “the largest deportation operation in the history of our country,” has been frustrated with the speed of removal flights from the U.S. His efforts have faced legal challenges, and some countries including Venezuela have resisted or slow-walked accepting deportation flights. Stephen Miller, an immigration hawk and the White House deputy chief of staff for policy, is spearheading the effort to find more countries willing to accept citizens from neither the U.S. nor the place to which they are deported. The White House’s Homeland Security Council he leads has asked State Department officials, among others, to continue negotiations so the U.S. has more places to send migrants who entered America illegally. U.S. officials said that there is pressure from senior leadership to deport more migrants in America illegally. Many of the nations under consideration for deportation agreements are countries where the U.S. government has raised serious concerns about human rights abuses, including the mistreatment of detainees and migrants, such as Libya and Rwanda. “Most of the countries that are willing to go along with this are probably going to be problematic countries,” said Ricardo Zuniga, a former senior State Department and National Security Council official focused on the Western Hemisphere under President Barack Obama. “But even they are asking ‘What’s in it for us? Who’s going to pay for it? How am I going to explain the political burden of accepting people on behalf of the United States?’”

In mid-March, Trump used wartime powers to deport over 130 alleged Venezuelan gang members from the U.S. to El Salvador. The seldom-used 18th-century Alien Enemies Act allows the president to deport foreign nationals who are deemed hostile during a time of war. A federal judge temporarily blocked its use, and later questioned whether the administration flouted his ruling, an accusation the White House denied. The alleged criminals deported under the law are among the U.S. deportees who have been locked up in a maximum-security prison in El Salvador, called the Terrorism Confinement Center and known as Cecot. During the final year of his first presidency, Trump briefly sought to strike agreements with several Central American countries to take deportees from other nations. The U.S. deported around 1,000 migrants from Honduras and El Salvador to seek asylum in Guatemala toward the start of 2020, but the Covid-19 pandemic quickly undercut that arrangement. Since then, former officials from Trump’s first term working at conservative think tanks began to develop lists of potential countries for such agreements. Some of Trump’s aides were inspired by the 2022 deal the U.K. struck with Rwanda, paying the east African country $155 million to accept migrants, primarily from the Middle East, who had reached Britain seeking asylum. The plan faced intense legal and political scrutiny. Only four people were relocated, and it was scrapped last year.

Exclusive: Shriha to Sada – NOC’s Fuel Management Strategy is a Deception and Data Manipulation

Oil affairs analyst Masoud Shriha, who won a court case against Farhat Bengdara regarding his UAE citizenship and arbitrary transfer, has responded to the recent report from an official NOC source about the corporation’s strategy for managing the country’s fuel needs. He dismissed the claims that the strategy contributes to market balance, calling them nothing but deception and data manipulation.

Shriha criticized NOC’s claim that diesel consumption has remained stable while gas consumption has increased, arguing that any rise in gas usage should logically lead to a decrease in diesel consumption, based on available power plant consumption data.

Furthermore, he stated that the report contradicts findings from international organizations and internal oil sector reports, which indicate that diesel consumption in the electricity sector has declined compared to other sectors. He attributed this to increased electricity tariffs for commercial entities, which have pushed businesses to rely on private generators, contradicting Libya’s energy conservation goals. Shriha accused the corporation of misleading regulatory bodies rather than implementing an actual strategy, adding that fuel waste in certain areas is excessive and far beyond actual needs. He also rejected the claim that mild weather reduced energy demand, saying such trends apply under normal conditions—but not in Libya.

Shriha called for greater transparency in reporting fuel imports and sectoral consumption, emphasizing the need for detailed figures on the quantities delivered to each port and how each sector utilizes them.

He also raised concerns about the missing fuel sales revenues from 2024, highlighting that the Central Bank should have received 2.8 billion LYD from subsidized fuel sales, yet official disclosures show that only 154 million LYD was deposited.

Shriha stated that he attempted to reach out to the Audit Bureau and the Attorney General to propose lasting solutions to these issues but received no response. He expressed disappointment that these institutions, which should prioritize public interest, instead focus on meetings with civil society groups that contribute nothing to safeguarding public funds.

He further accused NOC officials of favoritism, regionalism, and tribal bias, which he claimed had led to the waste of hundreds of millions of dollars. As evidence, he cited the arbitrary transfers ordered by Farhat Bengdara and his associates in the marketing division, referring to Bengdara’s own statements during attempts to settle the case.

Exclusive: NOC Official Clarifies the Truth Behind Reports of Increased Local Consumption

A responsible source at the National Oil Corporation revealed that the circulating claims about an unjustified increase in energy consumption require contextual clarification linked to well-known seasonal factors. The source explained that there is a phenomenon known as the winter peak period, which typically occurs in January and February, during which energy consumption naturally rises due to lower temperatures and increased demand for heating.

The source added that the months of October, November, and mid-December are characterized by relatively mild weather, leading to a noticeable decrease in energy consumption compared to colder months.

Additionally, the source pointed out that NOC data indicates an increase in the consumption of domestically produced energy compared to imported energy during this period. This reflects a greater reliance on national resources to meet rising demand, particularly during peak seasons.

In conclusion, the source affirmed that the NOC continuously monitors production and consumption levels and takes the necessary measures to ensure a balance between supply and demand, maintaining market stability and meeting citizens’ needs.