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Author: Amira Cherni

Focus Should Be on Internal Stability, Not External Emergencies – Ruffinetti Reveals to Sada the Truth Behind Replacing Iranian Oil with Libyan Oil

Italian strategic expert Daniele Ruffinetti told our source on Monday that Libyan oil could certainly serve as an alternative in the event of oil supply disruptions if Iran decides to respond by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. In such a scenario, Libya could distance itself from these dynamics and may be able to continue its trade without significant external restrictions.

However, Ruffinetti emphasized that it is important to keep in mind that Libyan oil production is heavily affected by internal instability. Rather than relying on external emergencies, the true priority should be strengthening internal stability in order to sustainably increase production.

He went on to say that this brings us back to an old issue: Libya has suffered from instability for many years, and this ongoing volatility continues to deprive the country of opportunities, according to his statement.

Exclusive: Central Bank Warns Aman Bank Over Deductions Exceeding 37 Million Dinars… and Demands Refund

Our source has exclusively obtained — confirming what it reported yesterday — a correspondence from the Central Bank of Libya addressing Aman Bank for violating CBL instructions by deducting a commission of 1 dinar (LYD) for each purchase transaction using the local card at Point of Sale (POS) terminals, 1% commission for each cash withdrawal using the bank’s card at ATM machines, 3 LYD per month for the SMS notification service, 100 LYD for issuing or renewing an international card, and 100 LYD in annual fees and for personal goods recharge, all of which are clear violations of the instructions issued by the Central Bank of Libya in this regard.

The Central Bank also warned Aman Bank to adhere strictly to the issued instructions, and demanded that it repay the collected commissions that were in violation of the mentioned circular during the year 2025 to the bank’s customers, with the total value exceeding 37 million dinars.

Exclusive: Husni Bey Comments on Central Bank’s Decision to Withdraw Several Libyan Banknote Denominations

Libyan businessman Husni Bey stated in an exclusive comment to our source: “The withdrawal of a banknote denomination or a specific issue of currency — whether it is the 50, 20, 5, or 1 dinar note — does not mean canceling the nominal value of the currency or the issue to be withdrawn. Rather, the withdrawal is merely a replacement of one form of money with another within the money supply, and a restructuring of the monetary base without any change to the overall totals.”

He continued: “For clarification, the term “money” applies to paper currency, which represents a liability of the Central Bank of Libya to the public (currency holders), in addition to deposit liabilities — or demand deposits — at commercial banks, which represent a liability of commercial banks to depositors.”

He added: “The proof that this decision does not reduce the total money supply or the monetary base (i.e., the Central Bank’s liabilities to paper currency holders + the reserves held at the Central Bank as legal reserve requirements, which stood at 20% of deposit liabilities until the end of 2024 and were raised to 30% by the Central Bank’s Board of Directors in 2025). Also, the cancellation of denominations does not affect additional reserves or the portion exceeding the 30% required by the Board.”

He confirmed: “For reference, the 30% threshold — the legal reserve or holding requirement — has been exceeded, bringing the total reserve held to nearly 50% (exceeding the required amount by 20%). This supports the theory that the liquidity shortage may be linked to this excess reserve, which was recorded during 2023 and the first quarter of 2024, during which the money supply increased by 37 billion dinars over 15 months.”

He concluded: “Canceling denominations does not amount to canceling money; it simply results in a replacement.” Based on published information about an additional 3 billion dinars in unreported currency, the negative effects of that may already have taken place. Yet, uncovering this breach allows the Central Bank to restructure the monetary base on scientific grounds. We now await the outcomes of the cancellation of previous issues of the 20-dinar note in order to complete the picture and make corrective decisions regarding past failures.”

Exclusive: Central Bank Ends Monopoly and Requires Banks to Open Letters of Credit for Small Traders with a Ceiling of $300,000

The Central Bank of Libya revealed to our source exclusively: “Following complaints submitted to the Central Bank by small traders, the Central Bank of Libya has obligated commercial banks to open letters of credit on behalf of small traders, instead of limiting the service to a specific group.”

The Central Bank directed the management of commercial banks to meet the needs of small traders with a ceiling of $300,000 or less, and to increase the number of letters of credit issued for accessing foreign currency — in a way that ensures and promotes fairness in allocation. This move comes as part of efforts to support small traders and micro-entrepreneurs.

Exclusive: In the Millions… Central Bank Sanctions Three Banks for Deducting Fees from Customers and Orders Refunds

Our source at the Central Bank of Libya revealed in an exclusive statement that UBCI, Aman Bank, and the Libyan Islamic Bank are facing penalties today, following in the footsteps of Jumhouria Bank.

The source stated: The Central Bank of Libya is punishing the three banks and compelling them to return amounts deducted from customers’ accounts due to various violations, imposing strict sanctions. The banks are: UBCI, Aman Bank, and Libyan Islamic Bank.

He added:

  • Aman Bank — more than 30 million dinars
  • UBCI — around 5 million dinars
  • Libyan Islamic Bank — around 1 million dinars

He explained that these penalties were based on complaints from citizens and followed inspection tours conducted by the Department of Bank and Currency Supervision.

Ashneibeesh: “Between Reality, Ambition, and True Will… What If Libya Became the Singapore of North Africa?”

Anas Ashneibeesh wrote an article in which he said:
In a world where technological advancement is accelerating, digital transformation has become a national necessity, not a choice. Singapore presents a model worth emulating in how it has employed technology to build a strong economy and an integrated society, despite limited natural resources. From this perspective, Libya—currently in a reconstruction phase—can benefit from this experience to build a modern state based on knowledge and technology.

First: The Singaporean Experience – From Planning to Execution

Early and Long-Term Planning
• In the 1980s, Singapore began drafting a comprehensive national computing plan.
• It set realistic goals for building a strong digital infrastructure.

Developing Digital Infrastructure
• Establishing high-speed internet networks.
• Digitally supporting vital sectors (health, education, transport).

Transition to E-Government Services
• Digitizing public services to reduce bureaucracy.
• Providing smart services to citizens through unified digital platforms.

Major Initiatives Like Smart Nation
• Utilizing AI, the Internet of Things, and big data analytics.
• Enhancing transparency and improving citizens’ quality of life.

Second: How Can Libya Benefit from the Singaporean Model?

Developing a National Digital Vision
Libya needs a clear digital strategy starting from the head of government and involving all institutions. Like Singapore, Libya can launch a national digital transformation plan that defines:
• Short- and long-term goals.
• Priority sectors (education, health, security, services).

Investing in Digital Infrastructure
Despite difficult conditions, gradual steps can begin by:
• Improving internet networks.
• Supporting digital transformation in government institutions.
• Establishing national data centers to protect information.

Digitizing Government Services
• Developing a unified platform for Libyan citizens, similar to “SingPass,” to simplify access to services.
• Implementing digital payment systems to reduce reliance on cash and enhance transparency.

Empowering Youth and Capacity Building
Like Singapore, Libya should:
• Support tech education and vocational training.
• Establish incubators and innovation centers for youth.
• Encourage digital entrepreneurship.

Enhancing Cybersecurity
Creating a national digital security body (like CSA in Singapore) has become essential to protect Libya’s infrastructure from cyber threats.

Third: Challenges Facing Libya and Solutions Inspired by the Singaporean Experience

Political Division:
Make digital transformation a neutral national project that transcends conflicts, becoming a unifying rather than dividing factor.

Weak Infrastructure:
Start with small-scale digital projects that directly impact citizens, paving the way for broader infrastructure development.

Lack of Technical Expertise:
Launch national training programs in digital skills in collaboration with universities and educational institutions.

Resistance to Bureaucracy:
Implement the principle of “smart governance” to simplify procedures and boost transparency and efficiency in service delivery.

Fourth: A Forward-Looking Vision for Digital Libya

If Libya adopts thoughtful and continuous steps toward digital transformation, it can, within a decade:
• Reduce administrative corruption through digital governance.
• Improve citizen services in education and healthcare.
• Empower the digital economy and create job opportunities for youth.

From this standpoint, Libya—like Singapore decades ago—is at a critical turning point. As it recovers from its crises, embracing the digital transformation model, as Singapore did, could be the path toward building a modern, resilient, and effective state. The key is not copying Singapore to the letter, but understanding the essence of its experience: planning, willpower, and inclusivity.

Mraja’a Ghaith Comments on Al-Safi’s Proposal Regarding Budget Ceilings and Revenue Tagging

Former member of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Libya, Mraja’a Ghaith, stated that the economic expert Mohammed Al-Safi had proposed setting a predetermined ceiling for the budget allocated to government entities, with the requirement that these entities operate within that ceiling. He also suggested linking some budget chapters to non-oil revenues — essentially allocating specific revenues for spending on specific budget items. This proposal sparked mixed reactions, with some in favor and others raising questions about its feasibility.

Ghaith explained that to understand what Al-Safi proposed, one must first understand how budget estimates are prepared in Libya. He noted that preparation begins from the bottom up — from the treasury-funded entities (except for central items like subsidies) — with estimates sent to the Ministry of Finance, which discusses them with the entities to arrive at a suitable figure. Generally, all entities inflate their estimates to minimize the impact of potential reductions. This practice is ongoing, and sometimes estimates are not built on sound foundations. He specifically pointed to Chapter Two – Operational Expenses, where overestimations are common. In contrast, Chapter One – Salaries is easier to control objectively, given the availability of employee data, though some exaggeration still occurs in areas like food allowances.

Ghaith added that Al-Safi proposed that the Ministry of Finance set a spending ceiling, especially for Chapter Two, and obligate all entities to allocate that ceiling across its items. This ceiling would be based on actual spending data from the past three to five years, as operational expenses are recurring and change in line with the number of employees or price levels.

He continued, saying that while some argue that the budget already acts as a ceiling, the current system relies on the proposals from government entities, which are then approved after discussions. However, the origin of these proposals still lies with the entities themselves. What the proposal aims to do is shift the control to the state, represented by the Ministry of Finance, allowing it to set expenditure limits directly. This doesn’t mean there won’t be exceptions or necessary adjustments.

Regarding Chapter Three, which Ghaith prefers to call the “Development Budget,” currently governed by the Planning Law, the ceiling is determined in aggregate — the state specifies the total amount to be spent on projects in a given year, and then priorities are set for what can be implemented with that amount. He pointed out a flaw: the full cost of a project is often included in the next year’s budget, rather than just the amount expected to be spent that year. Since some projects span multiple years, this inflates the budget with figures that are impossible to spend within a year.

On revenue tagging — the idea of allocating specific revenues to certain budget chapters and not exceeding those revenues in spending — Ghaith said this acts as both a control mechanism and an incentive to collect those revenues. For example, setting Chapter Two’s spending limit based solely on non-oil revenues (such as taxes, fees, state shares in public companies, and local fuel sales) would motivate efforts to collect them. For tagging to work properly, most public services must be transferred to local governments instead of remaining under central ministries. This would drive local authorities to collect more revenues if they wish to maintain spending.

He stated that this proposal could be considered a step toward reform — public financial reform being the first of many needed steps. He clarified that while it’s not the ultimate solution, improving public expenditure management and boosting state revenue collection are crucial milestones in any broader economic reform process. Hence, efforts in monetary, trade, and fiscal policy must work together toward comprehensive reform. He warned against focusing solely on the exchange rate, which often overshadows other areas of reform, emphasizing that adjusting the exchange rate alone cannot substitute for a full restructuring of fiscal policy (spending, revenues, public debt).

Ghaith praised the existence of public finance reform documentation from past years, including three-year medium-term budgets, implementing a single treasury account, reforming regulations and tax systems, among others. He said that capping the budget helps control available resources and reduces corruption and public fund waste, as there would be no surplus due to misestimations. He acknowledged that while it won’t eliminate corruption, it could certainly reduce it.

He concluded by saying:
“Everything proposed by Mr. Mohammed Al-Safi, as well as what we’ve discussed here, ultimately depends on the political will to implement financial reform and a genuine desire to combat corruption and misuse of public funds — not on using public money to gain popularity or short-term approval at the expense of sound economic policies.”

Ashneibeesh: From Cash Liquidity to the Digital Economy… A Libyan Roadmap Toward Electronic Payments

Anas Ashneibeesh wrote an article stating:
The world has long been moving toward reducing reliance on paper money, yet Libya still suffers from an economy heavily dependent on cash liquidity, which impedes transparency, enlarges the informal market, and slows the national economic engine. However, with the Central Bank of Libya continuing to print cash, a strategic opportunity arises to transform this reality into a launching point for an effective and sustainable digital economy.

This simplified article presents a practical and integrated action plan for Libya aimed at reducing dependence on paper currency and encouraging all segments of society—especially shop owners and public service providers—to transition to electronic payment systems.

First: Legislative and Regulatory Foundation

1. Establish a comprehensive national legal framework:
• Mandate government entities and public institutions to accept electronic payments.
• Regulate the work of payment service providers and digital wallets.
• Adopt digital signatures and digital identities linked to the national number.

2. Gradually restrict cash transactions in official institutions:
• Ban cash payments for government fees after a transitional period.
• Enforce digitization of payments in public facilities (schools, universities, hospitals).

Second: Developing Financial and Technical Infrastructure

1. Expand the point-of-sale (POS) and smart payment networks:
• Provide electronic payment devices at subsidized rates or through leasing systems.
• Support the adoption of a unified QR code for payments in small shops.

2. Develop national electronic wallets:
• Create a national digital wallet under the supervision of the Central Bank, linked to the national number.
• Encourage linking bank accounts to digital wallets.

3. Improve internet connectivity and online payment technologies:
• Expand internet coverage, especially in commercial areas.
• Develop special packages for merchants and service providers to support stable and fast connections.

Third: Incentives and Encouragement

1. Incentives for shop and public service owners:
• Temporary tax exemptions or discounts for establishments adopting electronic payment.
• Financial support to provide necessary technical devices.

2. Rewards for citizens:
• Financial bonuses or points when using electronic payments in daily transactions.
• Promotional campaigns in collaboration with major companies and stores.

3. Support for entrepreneurs and large traders:
• Provide short-term banking facilities in exchange for digitizing supply chains and payments.
• Link financing to the extent of the establishment’s commitment to using digital payment tools.

Fourth: Utilizing Cash as a Digital Catalyst

Rather than seeing cash printing as a burden, it can serve as a transitional tool toward a digital future:
• Allocate part of the printed cash to support merchants adopting electronic systems.
• Offer direct grants or financial support to store owners committed to reducing reliance on cash.
• Use liquidity to encourage wallet opening through symbolic first-use amounts.
• Link cash support to digital compliance—no financial support unless clear digital standards are met, such as transaction volume or registered POS in the national system.

Fifth: Awareness and Education

• Launch a nationwide awareness campaign on the benefits of electronic payment:
• Use media, mosques, universities, and schools for education.
• Engage public figures to strengthen citizens’ trust in technology.

• Workshops for shop owners and markets:
• Hands-on training for using payment devices.
• Provide field and technical support during the early months.

Sixth: Phased Implementation Plan

1. Phase One (0–6 months):
• Pilot electronic payments in key markets (Tripoli – Misrata – Benghazi).
• Establish on-ground technical support networks and performance monitoring.

2. Phase Two (6–18 months):
• Expand the geographical reach of the pilot.
• Mandate non-cash services for certain government entities.

3. Phase Three (18–36 months):
• Regulate the use of cash in certain sectors.
• Link government support and economic incentives exclusively to electronic transactions.

Seventh: Supervision and Implementation

• Project led by the Central Bank of Libya in partnership with:
• Ministry of Finance
• Ministry of Economy and Trade
• Ministry of Communications
• Telecom companies and banks
• Private sector and civil society

The shift from a cash economy to a digital one is not a luxury—it is a necessity for modernizing Libya, improving transparency, and stimulating the economy. The first step starts with utilizing existing resources—such as printed currency—as a bridge to the future.

Libya is capable of achieving this transformation if there is will, coordination, and continuity.
Electronic payment is not just a technology—it’s a new mindset for building a modern nation.

And the foundation should now be laid under the slogan:

“Today’s currency must be used to accelerate the end of cash tomorrow.”

OilPrice: Oil Blockade Looms Again as Libya Seeks to Attract Global Oil Investments

The oil-focused website OilPrice reported on Thursday that Libya aims to boost its oil production to 2 million barrels per day by 2028, through new bidding rounds designed to attract major international oil companies.

According to the site, rising political instability threatens to trigger a new oil blockade and production disruptions.

The report pointed out that eastern-backed forces are challenging Tripoli’s control over oil revenues, risking a repeat of costly shutdowns unless a revenue-sharing agreement is reached.

German Website: Abu Salim District Generates $300 Million Monthly from Smuggling — Oil Fuels Corruption in Libya

The German website Blitz reported on Tuesday that the takeover of the Abu Salim district in the capital Tripoli involves critical financial infrastructure. When a rival faction was eliminated under the guise of a government-led “purge,” control of Abu Salim shifted to forces loyal to the Government of National Unity (GNU). These forces now control nearly $1.8 billion in monthly oil revenues through the Central Bank. According to the site, this was not a security operation, but rather a hostile takeover. It is now estimated that Abu Salim alone generates over $300 million per month in illicit revenues through extra customs duties, port fees, and smuggling commissions.

The German outlet stressed that Libya’s war economy is not a chaotic accident, but a deliberately managed system that allows armed groups and complicit officials to plunder public wealth and evade accountability. Fuel smuggling gangs — operating under the protection of armed factions — move over 100,000 barrels of oil per day via the western coast and southern borders. Ports such as Tripoli and Misrata have become hubs for illicit trade, where parallel customs offices impose unofficial taxes of up to 25% on all imports and exports.

The report pointed out that oil and gas revenues, which are supposed to fund healthcare, education, and infrastructure, are instead being used to pay armed group salaries, purchase weapons, and fuel the black market economy, from which average Libyan families see no benefit. This corruption, the website says, is not hidden — it has become normalized in Libya.

According to the site, for Libyan citizens, the cost of this orchestrated disorder is catastrophic. Despite oil revenues reaching billions, the country is experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis, with inflation surpassing 200%, crushing household purchasing power, and unemployment — especially among youth — hitting 40%.

The report concludes: Every 3.6 seconds, a barrel of oil leaves Libya’s ports, but instead of fueling development, it fuels a hellscape of corruption, conflict, collapse, embezzlement, and looting, according to the website.

As Confirmed by Sada: Central Bank Announces Its Decision to Withdraw Several “Old Issues” of Banknotes from Circulation

The Central Bank of Libya has announced that its Board of Directors has convened and issued decisions to withdraw several “old issues” of banknotes from circulation — confirming the exclusive report published by our source in recent days.

The decision takes effect starting June 17, 2025, with the final deadline for commercial banks and their branches to accept the withdrawn banknotes being the end of the working day on Tuesday, September 30, 2025.

The withdrawn issues include:

  • The first and second issues of the 20-dinar banknotes
  • The sixth, seventh, and revised seventh issues of the 5-dinar banknotes
  • The sixth, seventh, and first issues of the 1-dinar banknotes

With a 3 Billion Difference… Central Bank Reveals It Received More 50-Dinar Notes Than It Printed — Suspicions Surround the 20-Dinar Note

Our source at the Central Bank of Libya revealed to that the Central Bank has uncovered an illegal printing of the 50-dinar denomination, confirming that the bank officially received over 3 billion dinars more than the original printed amount (13.5 billion dinars), bringing the total recorded amount of 50-dinar notes to more than 16 billion dinars.

The source also pointed to concerns of possible counterfeiting in the 20-dinar note, labeling it as a suspicious denomination. This has prompted the Central Bank to accelerate its withdrawal as a measure to protect reserves, and it has now been officially included among the withdrawn denominations announced today.

Reassuringly, the source stated that the Central Bank has already printed a new, secure polymer-based currency that is resistant to forgery and illegal replication as a replacement for the withdrawn notes. Additionally, efforts are underway to expand electronic payment services.

Exclusive: Central Bank Demands Accurate Sorting of Withdrawn Banknotes and Circulates Withdrawal Implementation Mechanism

Our source has exclusively obtained a circular from the Director of the Issuance Department at the Central Bank, addressed to commercial banks, outlining the mechanism for implementing the decision to withdraw certain currency denominations from circulation (1 dinar, 5 dinars, and 20 dinars).

Key points of the circular:

  • Deposits of the mentioned banknotes by customers will be accepted starting from June 17, 2025, with the final deadline for accepting deposits from customers set for September 30. The final deadline for banks to transfer these banknotes to the vaults of the Issuance Department and its branches is October 9, 2025.
  • The amounts withdrawn from circulation are to be deposited into the customers’ current accounts at all commercial banks and their branches.
  • Banks are required to develop a plan for receiving the withdrawn currency and to take the necessary logistical and organizational measures to ensure a smooth and easy deposit process for customers, including increasing the number of teller windows and extending working hours if necessary.
  • When commercial banks deliver the 20-dinar notes, they must sort and categorize them by issuance (first issue – second issue), according to the attached template.
  • Withdrawn currency must be delivered to the vaults of the Issuance Department in Tripoli, Benghazi, Al-Bayda, Misrata, Garabulli, and Sebha on a rolling basis.
  • Banks are required to exercise due diligence when receiving currency to prevent the acceptance of counterfeit notes, if any exist.
  • Tellers must be alerted to exercise extreme caution and precision when receiving deposits, using currency counting and sorting machines, as well as counterfeit detection devices.
  • Citizens who do not currently hold bank accounts must be allowed to open current accounts in accordance with the applicable procedures.

Al-Zantouti Writes: “The State Budget Between Capping, Labeling, and a Comprehensive Vision — and the Absence of Will to Combat Corruption and Mismanagement”

Written by financial analyst Khaled Al-Zantouti:

With all due respect to every viewpoint, a budget by definition implies capping—each expenditure item listed in the budget is inherently limited to a specific amount. Likewise, all items in the budget are labeled—meaning they are devoted to a particular purpose.

In emergencies, there are reserves that can be tapped, and deviations are permissible within certain limits, etc. These are basic, well-established principles of budget preparation, and thanks are due to those who helped clarify them.

Of course, any state budget must be prepared within the framework of a comprehensive economic vision and strategy aimed at achieving defined goals. “Management by objectives” is one of the methods often used in budget preparation. Again, appreciation goes to those who have highlighted this point.

In short:
We can prepare our budgets according to scientifically recognized theoretical concepts and the latest descriptive and quantitative models—even with the help of artificial intelligence. This is entirely possible.

But the real problem lies in the absence of a sincere national will to prepare and implement these budgets transparently on the ground.
The true crisis is that many—whether in legislative or executive authority—seek to manipulate the budget to serve their own narrow interests through regional and factional favoritism, often bypassing procedures (and at times even the law).
It’s a case where appearances suggest legitimacy, but the underlying intent is corrupt.

Worse still, we’ve seen a severe disruption of the budget preparation process, with changes to its traditional format and procedures—sometimes in open violation of the law.

While I respect the good intentions of some officials—whether in the East, West, or South—goodwill does not justify violating laws and established procedures.
Yes, there is such a thing as the Contingency Approach in decision-making, but even that must occur within legal boundaries.

Our tragedy—and I’m not generalizing—is that we call for fair distribution of the state’s budget across the country’s regions (a legitimate right), but the real hidden goal is often to seize the largest share of the “loot” through the gears of corruption and its many methods.
This is when the whole “camel is sold with its load,” so to speak—and again, I’m not generalizing.

Therefore, the solution starts with the existence of a true national will to eradicate corruption and initiate structural administrative reform.

It’s not just about capping and labeling the budget or formulating a comprehensive economic vision.

Our national duty is to eliminate all forms of corruption and mismanagement in the implementation of this budget.

Only then can we genuinely speak of budget capping and labeling within a comprehensive economic framework.

Otherwise—sadly—corruption and mismanagement will devour the entire budget, along with its caps, labels, and even its visionary goals.

May God support the honest, wherever they may be—in legislative or executive positions.

Al-Barghouthi Writes: The Proposal for Budget Capping and Labeling – A Serious Step Toward Fiscal Discipline That Restores the State’s Authority

Written by Professor of Political Economy Mohammed Belqasem Al-Barghouti: The Proposal for Budget Capping and Labeling – A Serious Step Toward Fiscal Discipline That Restores the State’s Authority

Amid Libya’s complex economic landscape—where resources are drained and traditional tools fail to bring financial stability—Professor Mohammed Al-Safi’s proposal for “budget capping and labeling” stands out as a serious, pragmatic, and forward-thinking initiative. It deserves careful discussion and analysis and opens the door to constructive debate on reforming public financial management.

Budget Capping: Spending Control, Not Development Curtailment
Al-Safi’s proposal is not a call for blind austerity but for conscious spending control. It is based on the principle of setting a cap on the budget to prevent financial slippage and to instill discipline as a cornerstone of good governance.

Capping here does not mean restricting development, but rather creating a realistic framework that shifts priorities from consumption-based spending to productive projects—from financial chaos to well-planned strategies governed by clear metrics and constraints.

Labeling: A Strategic Separation Between Oil Revenues and Current Spending
One of the noteworthy aspects of Al-Safi’s proposal is that it goes beyond merely reducing expenditures. It introduces the concept of labeling—a strategic move to separate oil revenues from day-to-day public spending.

This idea aligns with the recommendations of major international institutions and aims to protect oil revenues from depletion, redirecting them toward sovereign savings or long-term investments. It’s a call to end the state of “financial laxity” created by reliance on a volatile rentier resource and to establish a spending base rooted in realistic domestic revenues.

A Vision in Harmony with Institutional Reform
At its core, this proposal is in step with broader calls to rebuild the Libyan state on institutional foundations. In fact, it supports and reinforces them.

Moving toward budget capping and labeling obliges the state to define its economic and social priorities. It necessitates the development of tax collection mechanisms, stimulation of the private sector, and improvement of spending efficiency.

It is a step toward internal state reform—restoring financial functionality and reducing dependency on global market fluctuations.

A Bold Initiative in an Exceptional Moment
In today’s turbulent political and economic environment, it is rare to find individuals courageous enough to propose solutions that are both radical and practical.

Al-Safi has combined rigorous analysis with actionable steps and political realism—offering timely ideas of great responsibility and significance.

This is not merely a proposal to fix the budget. It delivers a political and moral message: that public funds are not subject to the recklessness of disorder, but a trust that must be managed with the wisdom of statehood—not as spoils of power.

Final Word:
How urgently we need such initiatives—ones that redefine the relationship between state and finances, between citizen and public service.

How urgently we need these proposals to intersect with a comprehensive economic vision that rebuilds Libya as a state, not just a market.

I commend Professor Mohammed Al-Safi for this contribution and call for a calm and responsible national dialogue that treats this proposal as part of a broader reform project—not as an isolated measure. It is through minds like his that nations rise and the first steps of real transformation are drawn.

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