Skip to main content

Author: Amira Cherni

The Central Bank Takes Measures to Adjust the Exchange Rate… Lists the Reasons and Issues Numerical Warnings

The Governor of the Central Bank of Libya issued a statement today, Sunday, regarding the Bank’s decision to adopt a series of strict measures, including a reconsideration of the exchange rate, in order to create balance in the economic sectors amid the lack of hope or prospects for unifying the dual government spending.

The Governor revealed that the volume of dual public spending during 2024 reached 224 billion Libyan dinars, including 123 billion in expenditures by the Government of National Unity, 42 billion in oil swaps, and about 59 billion in spending by the eastern-based Libyan government. This was matched by oil and tax revenues totaling 136 billion dinars. This level of spending created a demand for foreign currency amounting to $36 billion.

He continued: The expansion in dual public spending over the past years, and particularly in 2024, has led to a sharp increase in the money supply, which has reached 178.1 billion dinars. This is expected to result in several negative economic effects and poses serious challenges to the Bank due to the limited tools available to contain it. It will also create further demand for foreign currency, continued pressure on the Libyan dinar exchange rate in the parallel market, higher inflation rates, and risks to the public’s trust in the local currency.

He added that foreign currency revenues from oil exports deposited at the Central Bank amounted to only $18.6 billion in 2024, while expenditures in foreign currency reached $27 billion, leading to a significant gap between the demand for foreign currency and what is available. This has made it difficult for the Central Bank to define a clear exchange rate policy due to the increasing demand for foreign currency and the expansion of dual public spending.

He stated that if decisions to spend continue to be issued based on the 1/12 monthly budget formula in 2025 by both governments, and public spending continues at the same pace as in 2024, reaching 224 billion dinars, it will worsen the financial and economic situation of the country. This will present new challenges for the Central Bank, increase the demand for foreign currency, exacerbate deficits in the balance of payments and the general budget, and lead to a growing public debt.

He pointed out that data from the first quarter of 2025 clearly show the continuation of dual public spending, deficit financing, and increased demand for foreign currency, while oil revenues remain insufficient to cover the gap—something he described as dangerous. Foreign currency expenditures in Q1 amounted to around $9.8 billion (including $4.4 billion in letters of credit and transfers, $4.4 billion via business and personal-use cards, and $1 billion in government spending), equivalent to 55 billion dinars. Meanwhile, oil revenues and royalties deposited in the Central Bank amounted to only $5.2 billion by March 27, resulting in a deficit of about $4.6 billion in just three months. The situation could become even more critical if oil production or export levels decline due to any variable, or if global oil prices drop.

He added that the expansion of public spending, resulting from various decisions and laws, has increased the public debt held by the Central Bank in both Tripoli and Benghazi, reaching around 270 billion dinars—84 billion in Tripoli and approximately 186 billion in Benghazi. The total public debt is expected to exceed 330 billion dinars by the end of 2025 in the absence of a unified budget and with spending continuing at the 2024 rate. This is an extremely serious and unsustainable indicator and will cause major distortions in macroeconomic indicators.

He continued: To reduce the gap between supply and demand for foreign currency and the balance of payments deficit, the Bank was forced to use part of its foreign currency reserves temporarily to maintain exchange rate stability at acceptable levels, in order to preserve the prices of goods and services, and limit runaway inflation and the erosion of purchasing power. However, reliance on reserves is unsustainable. Therefore, the Central Bank had no choice but to reconsider foreign exchange regulations and the exchange rate in order to contain the consequences of unrestrained public spending and the absence of effective, goal-oriented macroeconomic policies.

The Central Bank affirmed that it continues to fulfill its duties in maintaining foreign assets at levels exceeding $94 billion, including $84 billion in reserves managed by the Bank, despite the significant challenges and the risky environment in which it operates.

It also noted that the inability to combat and curb the smuggling of goods and fuel has worsened the crisis by increasing the demand for imports and draining the foreign currency available to the Central Bank. Furthermore, the growing number of unregistered foreign workers and illegal migrants—estimated to cost around $7 billion annually—has increased the consumption of goods and demand for foreign currency in the parallel market, which has become a source of funding for illicit activities, money laundering, and terrorism financing.

Exclusive: Shriha Responds to Husni Bey’s Statements – “Subsidy Replacement Won’t Change Anything, It Will Only Increase the Burden on Libyans Right Now”

Oil expert Masoud Shriha commented in a statement to our source on the remarks made by Libyan businessman Husni Bey regarding the replacement of subsidies, saying: “Replacing subsidies will not change the economic situation — it will only increase the burden on Libyans at this time.”

He said: “According to the Central Bank’s report, revenues from fuel sales amounted to only 154 million Libyan dinars for 2024, while the Central Bank was supposed to receive around 2.8 billion LYD — meaning it only received 5% of fuel revenues. The question that arises is: where did the other 95% of the fuel revenues go?”

He continued: “In the event that subsidies are replaced, the situation will remain unchanged simply because the revenues won’t reach the Central Bank. Therefore, replacing the subsidies will only increase the burden on both the people and the Central Bank.”

He added that the current head of the National Oil Corporation is completely incapable of managing oil marketing, which is clearly evident in his public statements — a fact that all Libyans seem to agree on. He emphasized that the credibility of OPEC, Central Bank, and other local and international reports should not be questioned by any institution that lacks transparency and operates on the basis of regionalism and tribal favoritism rather than equal opportunity.

With His Prior Warning in Mind.. Eshnibish Calls to Lower Oil Prices Could Lead to a Severe Crisis for the Libyan Economy in 2025

Back in January, Professor Anas Eshnibish warned in a statement to our source that the increasing calls to lower oil prices — including direct appeals to the OPEC organization by one of the world’s largest oil-producing countries — could lead to a severe crisis for the Libyan economy in 2025.

He stated:
“Over the past few days, there has been news of calls to reduce global oil prices, and even a direct message was sent to OPEC by the president of a country with the highest oil production rate in the world. If such measures are implemented with the urgency we’ve seen, they would have the harshest impact on the Libyan economy and financial situation in general during 2025.”

He further explained the direct implications:
“In a country dependent on a rentier economy based on oil, and suffering from consecutive economic crises and budget deficits for years, a drop in oil prices will significantly and directly affect Libya’s economic situation due to its heavy reliance on oil revenues as the main source of public income.”

He clarified that the potential consequences include a decline in government revenues, a widened budget deficit, a drop in foreign currency reserves — which could pressure the exchange rate of the Libyan dinar — as well as social repercussions such as rising unemployment and stagnation in development projects.

Today, with the sharp decline in oil prices recorded in April, we find ourselves facing the actual realization of that prediction. Brent crude fell below $66 per barrel, its lowest level in years, impacted by global trade tensions and increased supply from the “OPEC+” alliance.

What the Libyan economy is currently experiencing is not surprising. Rather, it is a logical result of accumulated rentier policies and an overreliance on a single source of income without genuine diversification in the production base. Under such pressure, delaying reforms is no longer an option.

Among the key solutions Eshneibesh proposed at the time were: economic diversification, reducing public spending, supporting the private sector, investing in renewable energy, enhancing transparency, and improving the management of foreign currency — all of which remain viable solutions if there is political will and societal awareness.

Ultimately, the decline in oil prices is not merely a temporary crisis but a real test of Libya’s ability to transition from dependence to independence, and from consumption to production.

Al-Shhoumi Writes: “The Use of the Dollar as a Weapon, Imposing Tariffs, and Their Impact on the Future of American Hegemony”

The investment expert and capital fund manager in the United Kingdom, Mondher Al-Shhoumi, wrote an article titled: “The Use of the Dollar as a Weapon, Imposing Tariffs, and Their Impact on the Future of American Hegemony.

For decades, the United States has been the cornerstone of the global economic system, benefiting from the dominance of the US dollar and its leadership in the multilateral trading system. However, in recent years, it has begun to wield its economic power as a geopolitical weapon in unprecedented ways — from freezing foreign currency reserves of adversaries to imposing punitive tariffs on both trade partners and foes alike. These moves have highlighted the extent of American influence, but they have also raised serious questions about their long-term consequences. Could using the dollar as a weapon, along with a growing inclination toward tariffs, undermine the very foundations of American global dominance that Washington laid after World War II?

The Dollar as a Weapon

Since the end of World War II, the US dollar has been the dominant global currency in trade and finance. Today, it accounts for around 60% of the declared foreign currency reserves held by central banks worldwide, despite the US economy making up only about a quarter of global output. The dollar is involved in nearly 90% of all foreign exchange transactions globally, making it the preferred and trusted medium for trade and finance. This unique position has given the US what economists call an “exorbitant privilege” — the ability to borrow and spend internationally in its own currency with relatively low risk, along with massive political and economic influence thanks to its access to the global financial system.

However, the US has recently begun to use this financial strength as leverage to achieve foreign policy goals. This was starkly demonstrated by the freezing of Russia’s foreign reserves abroad in 2022 — the boldest use of the dollar as a weapon to date. Around $300 billion of Russia’s reserves were blocked in response to its war on Ukraine, alongside similar — though smaller — actions previously taken against Iran, Libya, Venezuela, and Afghanistan. From Washington’s perspective, these financial sanctions are powerful tools to punish adversaries and deter defiance. But for other nations, this trend sends an alarming signal: if America can paralyze any country’s access to the dollar and the financial system, is it safe to keep depending so heavily on the US currency?

This question has accelerated the global debate around de-dollarization. After Russia’s reserves were frozen, even some US allies realized they could be vulnerable if their policies diverged from Washington’s. As a result, multiple international actors began seeking alternatives. For example, China and Russia have increased trade in their national currencies. By mid-2024, about 27% of China’s foreign trade was denominated in the renminbi (yuan), up from just 17% in early 2022 — largely because China and its ally Russia began settling their bilateral trade in yuan instead of dollars.

In Europe, concerns about US dominance in payment systems have sparked local alternatives. The European Central Bank has warned about the risk of “economic pressure and coercion” due to American card networks (like Visa and Mastercard) controlling most payments. This has driven efforts to launch a digital euro to boost Europe’s financial independence. While this project is still in development and likely years away from implementation, its mere proposal reflects a growing desire to build financial systems less dependent on the US.

Still, viable alternatives to the dollar remain limited in the near term. No other currency comes close to matching the dollar’s global role. For example, China’s yuan accounts for only around 2% of global reserves. Additionally, most major economies — including US allies like Japan and the EU — have participated in recent rounds of sanctions (such as those against Russia), meaning switching to those currencies doesn’t fully shield against Western sanctions. There’s also the matter of network effects: the more the dollar is used, the harder it is to replace, and the costlier it becomes to build a global alternative.

Thus, financial analysts emphasize that any substantial decline in the dollar’s dominance will take a long time. Despite increasing calls for reserve diversification, the foundations supporting the dollar remain deeply embedded in the global economic and financial structure. In other words, the dollar may be a double-edged sword for America: while its weaponization may gradually drive others to find ways around it, the dollar’s entrenched role still gives Washington wide strategic leeway that could last for decades.

Tariffs as a Weapon

In addition to its financial influence, the US also possesses significant trade power, which it has recently used through broad tariffs to achieve political and economic goals. Departing from its traditional support of free trade, Washington imposed unilateral tariffs on several countries and trade partners in the late 2010s. The most notable example was the trade war with China that began in 2018, when the US imposed 25% tariffs on roughly $250 billion worth of Chinese imports, later expanding the scope to include another $300 billion in goods. China retaliated with its own tariffs on American imports.

This became the biggest trade conflict in decades, disrupting global supply chains and shaking financial markets due to the uncertainty and added costs imposed on businesses and consumers.

Tariff policies didn’t stop at strategic adversaries like China. They also targeted traditional allies: the US imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the EU, Canada, and Mexico, citing security and trade concerns. This unilateral approach angered allies, who saw it as a betrayal of the multilateral trade system that the US had helped create. Some European countries considered retaliatory tariffs and even more drastic measures like restricting American banks operating in Europe. These escalatory steps were never implemented, partly due to Wall Street’s global clout and European fears of damaging their own economies. Still, the fact that allies even considered such defensive actions highlights the extent of the rift that tariff policies have caused in trust between the US and its partners.

Domestically, US proponents of tariffs argue they are necessary to protect jobs and industries from unfair competition and to counter trade practices seen as market-distorting (like IP theft or dumping). Some view tariffs as a negotiating tool to pressure rivals into concessions. However, most economists doubt that tariffs effectively achieve these stated goals. For instance, the US trade deficit did not shrink significantly as a result of the tariffs, as it is shaped more by structural factors in the US economy (like savings and investment gaps) than by tariffs alone.

Experts warn that protectionist barriers could backfire. If tariffs fail to reduce the trade deficit — a scenario many economists see as likely — they could harm the US economy without achieving their purpose. Indeed, after tariffs were imposed, the US saw an increase in import costs for average consumers, effectively acting as a hidden tax on household spending. American companies that rely on imported components also faced pressure to raise prices or accept lower profit margins.

Moreover, confrontational tariffs could have long-term geopolitical consequences. Overusing protectionist tools risks weakening America’s leadership in shaping global trade rules. When the US bypasses institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and enforces unilateral measures, other countries may lose confidence in the international trade system and look for alternative arrangements. This is already happening, with some nations forming massive regional trade agreements that exclude the US, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which moved forward without Washington’s participation. As US influence in trade agenda-setting declines, other countries are stepping in to fill the gap and steer globalization in ways that suit their interests.

Implications for the Future of American Hegemony

Recent US actions reflect a blend of power projection and strategic gambling with the fruits of its dominance. On one hand, Washington has demonstrated its influence by showing it can twist the arm of even a major economy by denying access to dollars and American markets. On the other hand, these policies have raised the specter of global mistrust in US leadership. American hegemony since WWII has relied not just on hard power, but also on a vast network of alliances and the willingness of other nations — even allies — to accept the US as the guarantor of an open global economic system. If those countries begin to view the US as a player willing to weaponize the rules of the system against them during disputes, they will naturally seek to reduce their exposure to financial and trade dominance.

In the short term, this dissatisfaction may not lead to an immediate collapse of the dollar’s status or the unraveling of trade alliances. The US still holds a uniquely unmatched position for now…

Abu Snina: “On the United States Imposing Tariffs on Imports from Various Countries, Including Libya”

Written by: Economic expert Mohamed Abu Snina.

The United States of America is considered one of the largest economies dependent on the outside world. When you walk through American markets, it is rare to find a product made in America—especially consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, furniture, jewelry, technological products, and alcoholic beverages. Instead, you find all types of imported products from various countries, including European Union states, Southeast Asian nations, Mexico, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Middle Eastern countries, and even some Sub-Saharan African countries.

This means that the United States heavily relies on imports from abroad, and the trade balance is always not in its favor, even though the size of the American economy represents about 26% of the global economy. This situation is due to purely economic reasons.

Nonetheless, the United States surprised the world by imposing tariffs ranging from 10% to 50% on imports from over 200 countries.

The overall trade surplus of countries exporting to the United States—or in other words, the trade deficit of the U.S.—is due to the comparative advantages enjoyed by these countries, resulting from the low cost and high quality of their products and their lower production costs, including cheaper labor, compared to the cost of producing alternatives within the United States.

As of early 2025, the U.S. trade deficit had reached approximately $103.5 billion (not speaking of the cumulative deficit), which raised concerns within the American administration, as the size of the deficit had reached an unprecedented level.

It is noteworthy that, in practice, to offset the U.S. trade deficit, the U.S. Treasury prints and injects an equivalent amount of dollars into global markets ($103.5 billion during 2024) as repayment of its foreign debt resulting from the trade deficit with various countries. This has been the U.S. mechanism throughout history since the dollar became the world’s reserve currency—enabling the U.S. dollar to dominate the global economy.

In other words, the United States is always in a state of deficit in dealing with the outside world so that the dominance of the dollar over the global economy can continue. The U.S. imports various goods and products from around the world and, in return, prints dollars (not backed by anything) and pays them to other countries. This means that any measures taken by the U.S. to reduce imports in an attempt to shrink the trade deficit will come at the expense of the power, position, spread, and dominance of the dollar over international payments.

This is something the American administration is currently trying to ignore, under the assumption that the global economy is still unprepared to abandon the dollar as a reserve currency or as a medium for settling international trade transactions, or to replace it with a new international currency—such as the digital yuan that China is promoting and pushing for adoption. This also applies to efforts by the BRICS group to propose a new international currency in response to the U.S. dollar, which has become a tool to politically and economically threaten nations.

From a technical economic perspective, it is unlikely that U.S. authorities are unaware that declaring a tariff war on various countries is a double-edged sword. Besides the responses of countries whose exports to the U.S. are now subject to high tariffs (in an attempt to reduce their entry into American markets—the protective effect targeted by the U.S. government), these countries will, in return, impose high tariffs on American products imported into their markets. This reduces their imports from the U.S., and consequently, the U.S.’s export revenue to these countries. Additionally, certain American industries and small economic activities—especially agriculture, which relies heavily on imported inputs—may suffer from rising costs, operational difficulties, and even shutdowns. This is the expected result of what is known as a trade war, which the current U.S. administration pays little attention to, as it focuses instead on large capital-intensive industries such as the automotive and defense sectors, and increasing the Treasury’s revenues.

The outcome of this trade war is that all parties will suffer damage without exception, although the severity will vary by country. For the United States, the expected consequences include a rise in imported goods prices in American markets, which will further fuel inflation and may push the economy into stagflation.

While these imposed tariffs may increase U.S. Treasury revenues from customs duties, they simultaneously lead to income redistribution in favor of the suppliers of these consumer goods—at the expense of American consumers’ surplus (the redistribution effect). This occurs when the tariffs are reflected in retail prices in U.S. markets, a move that may face strong opposition domestically.

This means that the U.S.’s ability to enforce its policies and dominate international trade is not unlimited. It is surrounded by a set of factors and risks that may threaten the reality and future of the U.S. economy and the dollar’s global standing.

Therefore, it is expected that the U.S. administration may backtrack on continuing this declared tariff war on the global economy, and the legislative authorities (Congress) may intervene to cancel it to prevent the U.S. economy from slipping into stagflation.

As for the expected impact on Libya—being one of the countries targeted by the U.S. tariffs on its exports to America—the main commodity Libya exports to the U.S. is crude oil. Some statistics indicate that the value of these exports was around $1.57 billion in 2024, and their relative importance does not exceed 10% of total exports in the best-case scenarios, and on average does not exceed 7% of total oil exports.

However, Libyan crude oil and gas exports will not be subject to the tariffs recently imposed by the Trump administration, as imports of oil, gas, and petroleum products were exempted from these tariffs for all countries—except those under U.S. sanctions. This reduces the importance of these measures’ impact on the Libyan economy.

In other words, given the exemption of oil exports from these tariffs and the low relative importance of Libya’s non-oil exports to the U.S. in the total exports—which may be subject to a 30% tariff—these U.S. tariffs will have negligible effects on Libya’s trade balance.

Moreover, any response by Libyan authorities—such as imposing high tariffs on U.S. imports (which constitute no more than 3% of Libya’s total imports)—will also have a minimal impact on the Libyan economy, apart from raising the prices of these products in the Libyan market.

The expected impact on the Libyan economy from the U.S. administration’s tariff measures against many countries—including the EU, China, Japan, Korea, and Turkey—will be indirect. It will come from the rising prices of goods produced in those countries, which Libya regularly imports, and whose exports to the U.S. are now subject to higher tariffs. These countries may also impose tariffs on American products they import, in retaliation—such as the EU, Libya’s largest trade partner.

Additionally, Libya may face disrupted supplies of goods, affecting the local market, given the country’s heavy reliance on imports to meet domestic needs.

Another possible effect is the depreciation of the U.S. dollar in financial markets due to declining demand for American products. This would negatively impact the value of Libya’s dollar-denominated assets, including Central Bank reserves.

Expectations of a global economic recession caused by this global trade war declared by the U.S. against China and many other economies—and the return to outdated mutual protectionist policies, despite the existence of the World Trade Organization and its agreements—will lead to lower global oil demand and falling oil prices. This is the most dangerous consequence for the Libyan economy and the one that requires the most attention and response.

On the Future of the Libyan Dinar.. Al-Jhimi: “Don’t Be Fooled by Revenues or Get Too Comfortable with Reserves.. These Are the Solutions”

Former Minister of Planning Taher Al-Jhimi wrote on his official Facebook page:

What is the future of the Libyan dinar’s value relative to the dollar?

This is the question many Libyans are asking these days. Some are asking with eagerness, and everyone is wondering: will the coming weeks and months witness a decline in the relative value of the dinar? When asking this big question, they are looking for a simple answer: yes or no. Of course, after yes or no, there are other questions.

Economists typically don’t give a clear or definitive answer because they are influenced by their study of probability theory, which requires in-depth analysis. Therefore, in this post, there’s no yes or no, but rather: this is more likely than that, especially when we’re talking about the medium or long term. However, in short, we can say that if the current conditions and trends persist, the future of the dinar’s value is not promising.

Don’t blame the Central Bank for your current situation. The Central Bank is just one hand, and one hand can’t clap. Instead, blame those who have put you in this uncertain political and economic reality.

Don’t let oil revenues deceive you into thinking they will save you. They have become almost a neutral factor. How is that? These revenues won’t rise much if they increase, nor will they fall much if they decrease, at least in the foreseeable future. Why? Because the oil giants (Saudi Arabia and the US) are committed to the “oil market stability” policy. It’s not in Saudi Arabia’s interest for oil prices to rise too much for political reasons, and it’s not in America’s interest for this to happen for economic reasons (the transfer of wealth abroad).

Similarly, it’s not in Saudi Arabia’s interest for oil prices to fall too much for budgetary reasons, and it’s not in America’s interest for this to happen because it harms the interests of influential American companies (as Kissinger said in the early 1970s). Also, don’t get too comfortable with the Central Bank’s reserves, which are abundant; no matter how large they grow, they can shrink rapidly.

The solution I see is comprehensive and full economic reform, involving the implementation of all state tools and institutions, especially the economic and financial institutions. Two points must be noted here:

First: neglecting the problem or postponing action on addressing it will only worsen the situation and make it harder to solve. Second: positive results from economic reform don’t come quickly; they take time, depending on the surrounding circumstances.

Am I optimistic? No, I’m cautiously optimistic. I have a bit of pessimism and a bit of optimism. Why? Because economic reform is a surgical and painful process, especially for the poor and middle-class social groups. Therefore, only strong, stable governments with powers, let’s say realistically, close to dictatorship, can manage it. Let’s see…

Exclusive: Source at the U.S.-Libya Meeting Reveals Full Details to Sada, Highlighting Exploration of Business Opportunities in Libya

Our source from within the U.S.-Libya meeting corridors revealed the details of the roundtable gathering of American and Libyan executive officials, stating that the attendees included Libyan and American political figures. However, the meeting is a regular annual event held by invitation from the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations (NCUSLR) and the American Chamber of Commerce.

He added that the topics discussed were public affairs, general opinions, and idea exchange, emphasizing that the meeting is unrelated to matters of the Libyan state or its legislative and executive authorities. All attendees represent only themselves and their personal views and ideas.

He further stated that the main topic of discussion was the exploration of business opportunities in Libya and the enhancement of the healthcare sector in the country.

Libya Among Them: U.S. Seeks New Destinations for Deported Migrants

A report by The Wall Street Journal, citing officials say they have asked several countries in Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe

The Trump administration is pursuing agreements with several more countries to take migrants deported from the U.S., according to officials familiar with the matter. Immigration officials are seeking more destinations where they can send immigrants the U.S. wants to deport, but whose countries are slow to take them back or refuse to. Their desired model builds on a one-time deal the administration struck with Panama in February, under which they sent a planeload of over 100 migrants, mostly from the Middle East, to the Central American nation. Panama then detained the migrants and worked to send them to their home countries. The officials are in conversations with countries in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, but aren’t necessarily looking to sign formal agreements, the people said. What happens next to the deported migrants would depend on the specific host nation. The U.S. is agnostic, for example, whether the person would be permitted to ask for asylum or be deported to their own country, the people said. Among the countries the U.S. has asked to take the deportees are Libya, Rwanda, Benin, Eswatini, Moldova, Mongolia and Kosovo. The U.S. is hoping these nations will agree to the administration’s requests, perhaps in exchange for financial arrangements or the political benefit of helping President Trump accomplish one of his top domestic priorities. The administration is looking to certain Latin American countries to sign longer-term agreements designating them as safe places for migrants to ask for asylum instead of the U.S. Officials are close to finalizing such a deal with Honduras and are in negotiations with Costa Rica, according to a person familiar with the matter. None of the embassies for these countries immediately returned requests for comment. Stephen Miller addressing the media. Stephen Miller, White House deputy chief of staff, is spearheading the effort to find more countries willing to accept migrants the U.S. wants to deport.

In a statement, a State Department spokesperson didn’t address private diplomatic conversations but said “enforcing our nation’s immigration laws is critically important to the national security and public safety of the United States including ensuring the successful enforcement of final orders of removal.” State is working closely with the Department of Homeland Security “to enforce the Trump Administration’s immigration policies.” The White House and Department of Homeland Security didn’t respond to requests for comment. The negotiations are occurring as Trump, who campaigned on launching “the largest deportation operation in the history of our country,” has been frustrated with the speed of removal flights from the U.S. His efforts have faced legal challenges, and some countries including Venezuela have resisted or slow-walked accepting deportation flights. Stephen Miller, an immigration hawk and the White House deputy chief of staff for policy, is spearheading the effort to find more countries willing to accept citizens from neither the U.S. nor the place to which they are deported. The White House’s Homeland Security Council he leads has asked State Department officials, among others, to continue negotiations so the U.S. has more places to send migrants who entered America illegally. U.S. officials said that there is pressure from senior leadership to deport more migrants in America illegally. Many of the nations under consideration for deportation agreements are countries where the U.S. government has raised serious concerns about human rights abuses, including the mistreatment of detainees and migrants, such as Libya and Rwanda. “Most of the countries that are willing to go along with this are probably going to be problematic countries,” said Ricardo Zuniga, a former senior State Department and National Security Council official focused on the Western Hemisphere under President Barack Obama. “But even they are asking ‘What’s in it for us? Who’s going to pay for it? How am I going to explain the political burden of accepting people on behalf of the United States?’”

In mid-March, Trump used wartime powers to deport over 130 alleged Venezuelan gang members from the U.S. to El Salvador. The seldom-used 18th-century Alien Enemies Act allows the president to deport foreign nationals who are deemed hostile during a time of war. A federal judge temporarily blocked its use, and later questioned whether the administration flouted his ruling, an accusation the White House denied. The alleged criminals deported under the law are among the U.S. deportees who have been locked up in a maximum-security prison in El Salvador, called the Terrorism Confinement Center and known as Cecot. During the final year of his first presidency, Trump briefly sought to strike agreements with several Central American countries to take deportees from other nations. The U.S. deported around 1,000 migrants from Honduras and El Salvador to seek asylum in Guatemala toward the start of 2020, but the Covid-19 pandemic quickly undercut that arrangement. Since then, former officials from Trump’s first term working at conservative think tanks began to develop lists of potential countries for such agreements. Some of Trump’s aides were inspired by the 2022 deal the U.K. struck with Rwanda, paying the east African country $155 million to accept migrants, primarily from the Middle East, who had reached Britain seeking asylum. The plan faced intense legal and political scrutiny. Only four people were relocated, and it was scrapped last year.

Exclusive: Shriha to Sada – NOC’s Fuel Management Strategy is a Deception and Data Manipulation

Oil affairs analyst Masoud Shriha, who won a court case against Farhat Bengdara regarding his UAE citizenship and arbitrary transfer, has responded to the recent report from an official NOC source about the corporation’s strategy for managing the country’s fuel needs. He dismissed the claims that the strategy contributes to market balance, calling them nothing but deception and data manipulation.

Shriha criticized NOC’s claim that diesel consumption has remained stable while gas consumption has increased, arguing that any rise in gas usage should logically lead to a decrease in diesel consumption, based on available power plant consumption data.

Furthermore, he stated that the report contradicts findings from international organizations and internal oil sector reports, which indicate that diesel consumption in the electricity sector has declined compared to other sectors. He attributed this to increased electricity tariffs for commercial entities, which have pushed businesses to rely on private generators, contradicting Libya’s energy conservation goals. Shriha accused the corporation of misleading regulatory bodies rather than implementing an actual strategy, adding that fuel waste in certain areas is excessive and far beyond actual needs. He also rejected the claim that mild weather reduced energy demand, saying such trends apply under normal conditions—but not in Libya.

Shriha called for greater transparency in reporting fuel imports and sectoral consumption, emphasizing the need for detailed figures on the quantities delivered to each port and how each sector utilizes them.

He also raised concerns about the missing fuel sales revenues from 2024, highlighting that the Central Bank should have received 2.8 billion LYD from subsidized fuel sales, yet official disclosures show that only 154 million LYD was deposited.

Shriha stated that he attempted to reach out to the Audit Bureau and the Attorney General to propose lasting solutions to these issues but received no response. He expressed disappointment that these institutions, which should prioritize public interest, instead focus on meetings with civil society groups that contribute nothing to safeguarding public funds.

He further accused NOC officials of favoritism, regionalism, and tribal bias, which he claimed had led to the waste of hundreds of millions of dollars. As evidence, he cited the arbitrary transfers ordered by Farhat Bengdara and his associates in the marketing division, referring to Bengdara’s own statements during attempts to settle the case.

Exclusive: NOC Official Clarifies the Truth Behind Reports of Increased Local Consumption

A responsible source at the National Oil Corporation revealed that the circulating claims about an unjustified increase in energy consumption require contextual clarification linked to well-known seasonal factors. The source explained that there is a phenomenon known as the winter peak period, which typically occurs in January and February, during which energy consumption naturally rises due to lower temperatures and increased demand for heating.

The source added that the months of October, November, and mid-December are characterized by relatively mild weather, leading to a noticeable decrease in energy consumption compared to colder months.

Additionally, the source pointed out that NOC data indicates an increase in the consumption of domestically produced energy compared to imported energy during this period. This reflects a greater reliance on national resources to meet rising demand, particularly during peak seasons.

In conclusion, the source affirmed that the NOC continuously monitors production and consumption levels and takes the necessary measures to ensure a balance between supply and demand, maintaining market stability and meeting citizens’ needs.

With Increased Smuggling… Analysis of Fuel and Gas Consumption in Libya Before and After Massoud Suleiman’s Appointment as Head of the National Oil Corporation

Data published by the National Oil Corporation on its official accounts presents an analysis of fuel and gas consumption in Libya before and after the appointment of Massoud Suleiman as the head of the NOC, based on exclusive and precise analytical sources.

Comparison Periods

  • Before the appointment: 50 days from October 1, 2024, to November 19, 2024
  • After the appointment: 50 days from January 16, 2025, to March 6, 2025

Introduction

On January 16, 2025, Massoud Suleiman was appointed as the head of the National Oil Corporation. This appointment raised questions about potential changes in fuel management policies and supply strategies in Libya. This report aims to analyze changes in fuel and natural gas consumption across various sectors during the 50 days before and after the appointment. The focus is on the consumption of natural gas, crude oil, diesel, and heavy fuel oil to assess the impact of the new administration.

Comparison of Fuel and Gas Consumption Before and After the Management Change

EntityProduct50 Days Before Appointment50 Days After AppointmentChange (%)
GECOLNatural Gas (Million Cubic Feet)41,038.3545,816.95+11.64%
GECOLCrude Oil (Barrels)673,058.25907,653.39+34.86%
GECOLDiesel (Metric Tons)343,875.88337,605.08-1.82%
GECOLHeavy Fuel Oil (Metric Tons)11,245.9078,264.41+595.94%
NOCNatural Gas (Million Cubic Feet)5,753.226,883.90+19.65%

Analysis of Consumption Changes

1. Increase in Natural Gas Consumption

The consumption of natural gas by the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL) increased by 11.64% after Massoud Suleiman’s appointment. This suggests a rise in electricity generation using natural gas or the activation of additional power plants.

Similarly, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) recorded a 19.65% increase in natural gas consumption, possibly indicating greater operational activity or changes in gas-dependent production processes.

2. Significant Increase in Crude Oil Consumption

GECOL’s crude oil consumption rose by 34.86%, reflecting a greater reliance on crude oil for power generation, likely due to supply adjustments or operational decisions.

3. Stability in Diesel Consumption

Diesel consumption saw a slight 1.82% decline, which may suggest a gradual shift toward natural gas or improved efficiency in diesel-powered plants.

4. Massive Increase in Heavy Fuel Oil Consumption

Heavy fuel oil consumption witnessed the most dramatic surge, rising by 595.94%, signaling a major operational shift toward this energy source in certain plants.

Monthly Analysis of Heavy Fuel Oil Consumption

MonthAverage Daily Consumption (Metric Tons/Day)Total Monthly Consumption (Metric Tons)
October 2024407.7412,640
November 202436.001,080
January 20251,286.2639,874
February 20251,874.2152,478
March 2025 (Estimated)1,580.2448,987.32

Final Conclusions

  • Natural gas consumption increased by 11.64% after the management change, indicating a growing reliance on gas for electricity generation.
  • Crude oil consumption rose by 34.86%, possibly due to supply adjustments or shifts in power plant operational strategies.
  • Diesel consumption remained relatively stable, with a slight decrease of 1.82%, potentially reflecting a gradual shift to alternative energy sources.
  • The most significant change was the extraordinary 595.94% increase in heavy fuel oil consumption, highlighting a major operational shift.

These changes suggest that during Massoud Suleiman’s tenure as head of the NOC, fuel consumption strategies in both the electricity and oil sectors underwent modifications, likely due to operational decisions or shifts in fuel supply dynamics.

Africa Intelligence: As the Oil Swap Deal Nears Its End, NOC Faces a Critical Period with No Alternatives Yet

A report published by Africa Intelligence revealed that despite continued fuel imports in March, the National Oil Corporation remains unable to pay its bills, while the Central Bank of Libya is concerned about declining crude oil revenues.

The report stated that Masoud Suleiman, the head of the NOC, took a major risk on March 1 by officially halting the oil swap system, which allowed crude oil to be exchanged for imported fuel. The NOC has limited capacity to refine crude oil domestically.

The corporation now enters a dangerous period of uncertainty following the abrupt termination of the swap system, as no alternative financing mechanism has been agreed upon.

Suleiman’s decision to end the system came in response to a ruling by Libya’s Attorney General, Al-Siddiq Al-Sour, who called for its termination in January, arguing that it harmed state interests. The decision was followed by criticism from Libya’s Audit Bureau, which revealed that the swap system resulted in significant additional costs to the NOC’s budget, amounting to approximately $981 million in 2023.

Before the swap system was introduced in 2021 under former NOC chairman Mustafa Sanalla, the company had a budget for fuel imports managed by the CBL under government supervision. However, with the swap system now abolished, Suleiman has placed the responsibility of securing the necessary funding for fuel imports on Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, who must provide funds as quickly as possible to avoid an economic crisis.

At the same time, the CBL must decide on the state budget, which may be divided between the two rival governments.

According to the report, no funding agreement has been reached yet. In its February report, the CBL did not mention any new budget allocation for fuel imports but clarified that fuel import bills had been paid since 2021 using the “swap system.”

For now, fuel deliveries have not stopped, and supplies remained stable in March. While the NOC awaits the necessary budget, it has been given three months to settle its bills, according to oil industry sources. The payments must be made by June, or Libya could face a fuel shortage that would impact the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), which supplies power to the country’s infrastructure.

Meanwhile, Libyan crude oil sales have declined in recent weeks. The NOC, seeking to avoid panic, has attributed this drop to normal market fluctuations. However, the CBL issued a press statement on March 18 expressing concern over the current financial instability, which has led to weaker oil revenues and delays in collections.

Oil revenues remain Libya’s primary source of foreign currency, enabling the CBL to provide foreign exchange liquidity. According to CBL data, hydrocarbon export revenues between January and March ranged between $778 million and $1.7 billion, while foreign currency sales reached $2.3 billion during the same period.

Shnibish Writes: “Seasonal Greed and Electronic Services Security: Between Transaction Growth and Protection Assurance”

Written by Anas Shnibish: “Seasonal Greed and Electronic Services Security: Between Transaction Growth and Protection Assurance”

With the increasing reliance on electronic services in various aspects of life, digital security has become a top priority. At the same time, the concept of “seasonal greed” emerges, referring to peak periods in the use of these services, such as seasonal promotions, holidays, major discounts, and annual events. During these times, user activity surges, posing significant cybersecurity challenges.

The question here is: What role do banks, service providers, and customers play in enhancing the security of electronic services, especially during peak seasons?

The Role of Banks in Electronic Security

Banks are responsible for securing digital financial transactions, protecting customer data, and preventing fraud. Their role includes:

  • Enhancing security systems: Utilizing strong encryption, firewalls, and fraud detection systems to monitor suspicious activities.
  • Providing two-factor authentication (2FA): Requiring an additional verification code when logging in or making payments.
  • Monitoring transactions and detecting fraud: Using artificial intelligence to analyze financial operations and identify any unusual activities.
  • Launching awareness campaigns: Sending alerts and warning messages about cyber fraud methods such as phishing and fake websites.
  • Offering secure payment tools: Including virtual cards and tokenization technology to prevent the theft of original card data.

The Role of Electronic Service Providers

Electronic service providers include e-commerce platforms, payment processors, internet service providers, and fintech companies. Their responsibilities include:

  • Implementing strong security protocols: Such as HTTPS protocol, advanced encryption (SSL/TLS), and intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) to protect user data.
  • Ensuring system stability during peak periods: By optimizing server performance and utilizing cloud computing technologies to prevent downtime and security breaches.
  • Conducting regular security audits: To detect and fix vulnerabilities in websites and applications.
  • Protecting customer data: Through policies such as not storing sensitive payment information and encrypting user details.
  • Developing additional verification tools: Such as biometric authentication (fingerprint or facial recognition) to secure electronic transactions.

The Customer’s Role in Protecting Their Data and Funds

Despite the significant efforts of banks and service providers, the customer remains the weakest link if they do not follow essential security measures. Their responsibilities include:

  • Not sharing sensitive information: Such as passwords, bank card details, or verification codes with any unauthorized entity.
  • Purchasing only from trusted websites: Ensuring they use HTTPS protocol and have clear data protection policies before entering payment details.
  • Enabling two-factor authentication (2FA) on financial and electronic accounts.
  • Regularly updating passwords: Using strong, unique passwords for different accounts.
  • Reviewing banking transactions regularly: And immediately reporting any unknown transactions.
  • Avoiding clicking on suspicious links: Sent via email or text messages, as they may be phishing attempts.

Conclusion

Ensuring the security of electronic services requires joint cooperation between banks, service providers, and customers. While banks work on securing financial transactions, service providers must offer a safe electronic infrastructure, and customers must follow basic protection measures to avoid falling victim to cyber fraud. In the end, cybersecurity is a shared responsibility, and any weakness in one party can lead to risks that threaten everyone.

Exclusive to Sada: The Conflict Over Cement Factories Stems from a Spoils Worth Over 3.5 Billion Dinars Annually for Brokers, Criminals, Traders, and Speculators Across Libya

The Public Prosecution has ordered the arrest of an outlawed group accused of placing an earthen barrier in front of the gate of Al-Burj Cement Factory, halting its operations and causing significant losses to the company due to the disruption of production.

Our exclusive sources revealed that the ongoing conflict over cement factories in Libya, along with factory shutdowns, strikes, and arrest warrants issued by the Public Prosecution, is driven by the lucrative price difference, which amounts to more than 3.5 billion dinars annually for brokers, criminals, traders, and speculators across Libya. (The spoils from the Arab Union Cement Factory alone are estimated at 1 billion dinars annually.)

Exclusive: The Public Prosecutor Summons Ben Gdara for Investigation Over Financial Mismanagement of State Revenues from the National Oil Corporation

Our source has exclusively obtained a letter from the Public Prosecutor’s Office to the current president of the National Oil Corporation, summoning former chairman Farhat Ben Gdara for investigation.

The case concerns financial mismanagement of state funds derived from the National Oil Corporation’s revenues, linked to the amendment of the Production Sharing Agreement for Contract Area (D). This area includes Offshore Block MN-41 (Bahr Al-Salam) and Onshore Block 169 (Al-Wafa Field), which was signed between the National Oil Corporation and Eni North Africa in January 2023 to facilitate the development of Structures (A – H) in Bahr Al-Salam.

Additionally, the amendment increased the foreign partner’s production share from 30% to 39% in Contract Area (D), which allegedly caused harm to public interest and state finances.