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The Central Bank Takes Measures to Adjust the Exchange Rate… Lists the Reasons and Issues Numerical Warnings

The Governor of the Central Bank of Libya issued a statement today, Sunday, regarding the Bank’s decision to adopt a series of strict measures, including a reconsideration of the exchange rate, in order to create balance in the economic sectors amid the lack of hope or prospects for unifying the dual government spending.

The Governor revealed that the volume of dual public spending during 2024 reached 224 billion Libyan dinars, including 123 billion in expenditures by the Government of National Unity, 42 billion in oil swaps, and about 59 billion in spending by the eastern-based Libyan government. This was matched by oil and tax revenues totaling 136 billion dinars. This level of spending created a demand for foreign currency amounting to $36 billion.

He continued: The expansion in dual public spending over the past years, and particularly in 2024, has led to a sharp increase in the money supply, which has reached 178.1 billion dinars. This is expected to result in several negative economic effects and poses serious challenges to the Bank due to the limited tools available to contain it. It will also create further demand for foreign currency, continued pressure on the Libyan dinar exchange rate in the parallel market, higher inflation rates, and risks to the public’s trust in the local currency.

He added that foreign currency revenues from oil exports deposited at the Central Bank amounted to only $18.6 billion in 2024, while expenditures in foreign currency reached $27 billion, leading to a significant gap between the demand for foreign currency and what is available. This has made it difficult for the Central Bank to define a clear exchange rate policy due to the increasing demand for foreign currency and the expansion of dual public spending.

He stated that if decisions to spend continue to be issued based on the 1/12 monthly budget formula in 2025 by both governments, and public spending continues at the same pace as in 2024, reaching 224 billion dinars, it will worsen the financial and economic situation of the country. This will present new challenges for the Central Bank, increase the demand for foreign currency, exacerbate deficits in the balance of payments and the general budget, and lead to a growing public debt.

He pointed out that data from the first quarter of 2025 clearly show the continuation of dual public spending, deficit financing, and increased demand for foreign currency, while oil revenues remain insufficient to cover the gap—something he described as dangerous. Foreign currency expenditures in Q1 amounted to around $9.8 billion (including $4.4 billion in letters of credit and transfers, $4.4 billion via business and personal-use cards, and $1 billion in government spending), equivalent to 55 billion dinars. Meanwhile, oil revenues and royalties deposited in the Central Bank amounted to only $5.2 billion by March 27, resulting in a deficit of about $4.6 billion in just three months. The situation could become even more critical if oil production or export levels decline due to any variable, or if global oil prices drop.

He added that the expansion of public spending, resulting from various decisions and laws, has increased the public debt held by the Central Bank in both Tripoli and Benghazi, reaching around 270 billion dinars—84 billion in Tripoli and approximately 186 billion in Benghazi. The total public debt is expected to exceed 330 billion dinars by the end of 2025 in the absence of a unified budget and with spending continuing at the 2024 rate. This is an extremely serious and unsustainable indicator and will cause major distortions in macroeconomic indicators.

He continued: To reduce the gap between supply and demand for foreign currency and the balance of payments deficit, the Bank was forced to use part of its foreign currency reserves temporarily to maintain exchange rate stability at acceptable levels, in order to preserve the prices of goods and services, and limit runaway inflation and the erosion of purchasing power. However, reliance on reserves is unsustainable. Therefore, the Central Bank had no choice but to reconsider foreign exchange regulations and the exchange rate in order to contain the consequences of unrestrained public spending and the absence of effective, goal-oriented macroeconomic policies.

The Central Bank affirmed that it continues to fulfill its duties in maintaining foreign assets at levels exceeding $94 billion, including $84 billion in reserves managed by the Bank, despite the significant challenges and the risky environment in which it operates.

It also noted that the inability to combat and curb the smuggling of goods and fuel has worsened the crisis by increasing the demand for imports and draining the foreign currency available to the Central Bank. Furthermore, the growing number of unregistered foreign workers and illegal migrants—estimated to cost around $7 billion annually—has increased the consumption of goods and demand for foreign currency in the parallel market, which has become a source of funding for illicit activities, money laundering, and terrorism financing.

Exclusive.. Al-Sanussi: “Organizing Exchange Offices is an Excellent Decision, Though Delayed, But Procedures Shouldn’t Be Complicated”

Economic expert, Mohamed Al-Sanussi, stated in an interview with our source that the decision to grant licenses to a group of exchange offices is an excellent one, despite being delayed by at least ten years. The regulation of exchange office operations should have occurred as early as 2013, as the number of exchange offices and currency transfers has significantly increased since that year.

He continued: “Regulating and monitoring the operations of exchange offices will certainly lead to many positive outcomes on one hand, and will also eliminate several negatives, but with certain conditions.

First: State institutions should not rush to close exchange offices that have not obtained a license. I expect that those offices will be shut down, but they should be given a grace period to obtain a license, at least until the end of the year.

Second: Obstacles and difficulties should not be placed in the way of exchange offices that have obtained a license. They should not be forced to operate inefficiently as we see in banks due to complications and bureaucracy. The regulation of exchange offices should be flexible, and the excuse of combating money laundering and terrorism financing should not be used to hinder the offices’ ability to operate effectively as before. I expect exchange offices to be required to submit numerous documents for every transaction, which will undoubtedly restrain their operations, making unlicensed offices the better option.

Third: There should be greater transparency from the Central Bank, clearly outlining all procedures, laws, and requirements that licensed exchange offices will operate under, as well as the benefits that a licensed office will receive. This will encourage other offices to apply for a license.”

He concluded by saying: “The main goal the Central Bank should focus on now is eliminating the gap between the official rate and the black market rate. This would reduce the demand from speculators who buy goods or apply for letters of credit not out of necessity for foreign currency, but simply to sell it at a higher price in the parallel market.

We also hope that the Central Bank strengthens its media role and fulfills the promises made by this administration, many of which have yet to be implemented.”

Exclusive: Abu Sriwil Comments on the Activation of Exchange Services in Libya – Motives and Effects on the Parallel Market and Exchange Rate

International expert Yassin Abusriwil spoke exclusively to our source, stating:
In light of the economic challenges Libya faces, the Central Bank of Libya seeks to implement measures aimed at regulating the foreign exchange market and enhancing financial stability. Among these measures is the activation and regulation of exchange services—a decision that carries clear economic objectives but also raises questions about its impact on the parallel market, exchange rate, and the continued inflow of foreign currency in response to growing market demand.

He added:
In this article, we outline our perspective on the reasons behind this measure, analyze its potential effects, and focus on its implications for the Libyan economy.

First: Reasons Behind the Central Bank of Libya’s Decision

According to our analysis, the decision could be driven by the following factors:

1. Reducing Dependence on the Parallel Market

The parallel market remains the primary source of foreign currencies in Libya due to restrictions on purchasing foreign currency through official channels. This fosters speculation and creates a significant disparity between the official exchange rate and the black market rate, leading to sharp economic fluctuations. Activating exchange companies aims to provide official alternatives that reduce reliance on the parallel market.

2. Enhancing Transparency and Financial Oversight

By activating exchange services, the Central Bank of Libya seeks to strengthen oversight of foreign currency flows, which helps combat money laundering and the financing of illegal activities. This step also allows for the collection of accurate data on foreign currency demand, improving the effectiveness of monetary policies and aligning with international regulations.

3. Improving Banking Sector Efficiency

Libyan banks face liquidity issues and difficulties in executing international financial transactions, pushing individuals and businesses toward the parallel market. Activating exchange companies could ease pressure on banks, offering faster and more flexible alternatives for financial transfers and currency purchases.

4. Reducing Exchange Rate Volatility

Having official exchange channels enables the central bank to intervene more effectively in determining the exchange rate, narrowing the gap between the official rate and the parallel market, thus contributing to relative economic stability.

Second: Expected Effects and Outcomes of Activating Exchange Services

1. Organizing the Foreign Exchange Market

This decision is expected to bring greater regulation to the foreign exchange market, ensuring transactions follow clear, monitored procedures, thereby reducing risks of manipulation and speculation.

2. Strengthening Financial Stability

With official exchange services available, individuals and businesses can access foreign currency at more stable rates, limiting financial market disruptions and boosting confidence in the banking sector.

3. Improving the Business and Investment Environment

Making foreign currency available through official channels will facilitate imports and financial transfers, fostering a better business climate and enhancing the private sector’s ability to plan and invest effectively.

Third: Impact on the Parallel Market and Exchange Rate

1. Lower Demand for the Parallel Market

As foreign currency becomes available through official exchange companies, demand for the parallel market is expected to decline, especially if official rates are competitive and meet market needs.

2. Narrowing the Gap Between Official and Parallel Market Rates

With increased foreign currency supply through licensed exchange companies, the disparity between official and black market rates will shrink, reducing speculation and fostering relative exchange rate stability.

3. Possibility of a New Parallel Market Emerging

If foreign currency distribution mechanisms through exchange companies are not fair or sufficient to meet demand, a new parallel market may emerge, with individuals circumventing restrictions, potentially sustaining some speculative activities.

4. Impact on the Libyan Dinar’s Value

If exchange market regulation increases public confidence in official channels, the Libyan dinar may see slight appreciation against foreign currencies. However, if the new system fails to meet market demand, pressure on the exchange rate may persist.

The Continued Flow of Foreign Currency: Challenges and Solutions

Regarding the ongoing availability of foreign currency, Abu Sriwil stated that several key factors influence whether companies can access foreign currency, including:

  • Adequate Foreign Reserves: If the Central Bank of Libya cannot meet rising demand, sustained pressure could drive a return to reliance on the parallel market.
  • Monetary Policy Flexibility: Strict restrictions on foreign currency transactions may limit individuals’ and businesses’ ability to obtain hard currency through official channels.
  • Political and Security Stability: Political unrest can disrupt financial flows and foreign investments, reducing foreign currency availability in the official market.

The Role of Supply and Demand in Sustainability

  • If demand for foreign currency exceeds the new system’s capacity to supply it—an expected scenario given the lack of organized trade policies—the gap between supply and demand could weaken the measure’s effectiveness.
  • Conversely, if the central bank can regularly provide sufficient foreign currency at competitive rates, market stability may improve, reducing the parallel market’s role. Conducting market studies to determine real demand is crucial.

Proposed Solutions to Ensure Foreign Currency Availability

  • Increasing Foreign Reserves Through Oil Revenue Growth: Since oil revenues are Libya’s primary source of foreign currency, ensuring stable production and exports will help maintain a steady foreign exchange supply.
  • Broader Banking Reforms: Activating exchange companies should be accompanied by wider banking sector reforms, including easing restrictions on financial transfers and improving the foreign investment environment.
  • Enhancing Transparency and Oversight: To ensure success, strict oversight mechanisms must be implemented to prevent manipulation or unlawful exploitation of foreign currency distribution.

Final Thoughts

Abu Sriwil concluded:
Activating exchange services in Libya is a crucial step toward regulating the foreign exchange market and promoting financial stability. However, it is not a standalone solution to the economic issues related to the exchange rate and parallel market. The long-term success of this measure depends on the Central Bank of Libya’s ability to meet rising demand for foreign currency and the flexibility of monetary policies to adapt to economic changes. If implemented within a broader financial and banking reform strategy, this initiative could help curb speculation and contribute to greater economic stability.

Exclusive: Sources Expect Dollar Exchange Rate to Decline in the Parallel Market This Week

A special source revealed to our source that the exchange rate of the dollar in the parallel market is expected to drop below 6.4 Libyan dinars this week.

It is worth noting that an agreement was reached between the Central Bank of Libya, the National Oil Corporation, with support from the Audit Bureau and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, to transfer oil revenues to the Central Bank on a daily basis. This arrangement has facilitated the Central Bank’s ability to cover foreign exchange requests starting today. The bank will continue to sell foreign currency at the same pace as on February 2 in the coming days.

Al-Akari Questions: “Is the Exchange Rate Increase Justified During This Period?”

Economic expert Misbah Al-Akari raised questions in a post on his official page regarding the recent increase in the exchange rate, asking whether it has legitimate justifications. He explained that exchange rate hikes typically occur when there is a decrease in the supply of foreign currencies, complex restrictions on accessing foreign currency, political turmoil, or the shutdown of oil fields. However, he emphasized that none of these conditions currently apply.

Al-Akari also questioned whether the Central Bank has the tools to intervene and curb the currency’s depreciation. He affirmed that it does, noting that central banks monitor exchange rates and determine when to intervene to prevent currency weakening. This can involve purchasing large amounts of domestic currency by selling foreign reserves or reassessing exchange rates.

He elaborated on the Libyan context, referencing state reserves, which, according to Audit Bureau reports, amount to over $80 billion. This equates to LYD 455 billion. The current demand for foreign currencies is LYD 170 billion, equivalent to $29.8 billion or 37% of foreign reserves. In most countries, monetary policy tools, particularly interest rates, are used to manage high money supply and ease pressure on foreign currency demand. However, in Libya, this tool is not utilized.

Al-Akari highlighted that the new Central Bank management has adopted measures such as an Islamic finance product called “absolute mudaraba.” This initiative aims to employ surplus funds from commercial banks at the Central Bank, aligning with depositor funds in commercial banks. This measure is expected to absorb a portion of the money supply, reducing pressure on foreign reserves.

He added that developments point to a resolution of barter issues, likely boosting oil revenues as crude prices rise to $80 per barrel.

Al-Akari concluded by noting the growth in oil production, relative security stability, and active reconstruction efforts. He also highlighted upcoming Central Bank decisions, including improved foreign exchange services, payroll withdrawals through electronic payment systems at 60% of salary value, and clarified that he does not believe the dollar’s exchange rate will continue to rise.

Exclusive: Husni Bey Comments on Central Bank and NOC Statement as a Wake-Up Call, and Questions the Appropriate Exchange Rate to Avoid Budget Deficit

Libyan businessman Husni Bey told our source: “Through following the page The Economic Salon, which is a non-governmental organization and civil society entity focused on economic matters, and observing the discussions, reactions, and critiques of the circulars issued by the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), it’s clear we are hearing alarm bells.”

He added:
“The response from the National Oil Corporation (NOC) attributing the low revenues in 2024 to several reasons includes:

  • Oil shutdowns due to political issues.
  • Rising fuel costs and exchange agreements.
  • The lack of a budget representing fuel and energy allocations.”

Husni Bey commented with numerical analysis, stating: “The CBL’s circular and the NOC’s response regarding the reasons for the decline in cash flows from oil sales represent a wake-up call or an opportunity to raise public awareness and demand change.”

He further said: “There is no disagreement that deep distortions threaten Libya and its people, as reflected in the growing fuel bill, according to the NOC’s statement, especially after the adoption of barter programs since 2020 and earlier.”

Continuing, he noted: “The Central Bank sounds the alarm, and the NOC issues warnings; both are correct from their respective perspectives. The root cause of what is happening is the failure of the House of Representatives and the Government of National Unity to approve a budget that includes all revenue and expenditure items, covering total oil production and expenditures, including fuel and energy. The government must present a budget, and the House of Representatives must approve one that sets limits on government spending.”

He emphasized: “Expenditures, in any form, must not exceed total revenues from all sources. In my view, resistance to changing the mechanism and system of energy and fuel subsidies, which consume 38% of Libya’s oil production share after deducting the 12% share of foreign companies, is a priority for any attempt at fiscal reform.”

He added: “Our mindset as Libyans calls for change, but our hearts insist on maintaining the status quo—even as the purchasing power of the dinar collapses, inflation rises, and subsidies are stolen or smuggled. Strangely, we all aspire to and demand better results and different outcomes using the same inputs and mechanisms unchanged for 50 years. We even reject changes, starting with substituting subsidies with cash to achieve fair distribution. We fail to recognize that the fuel bill approaches $14 billion, costing each Libyan family about $12,000 annually or 5,500 LYD monthly.”

Husni Bey continued: “It was a general shock when the NOC transferred $500 million to the government’s account at the Central Bank compared to the significantly higher dollar sales made by the Central Bank. Everyone is asking, ‘What’s going on?’ Personally, I believe the only change is the rising fuel bill, which reduces net dollar revenues transferred to the CBL. The explanation in numbers is as follows:

  • The $500 million transferred by the NOC covers oil sales for only eight days.
  • If the transfer continues at the same value ($500 million every eight days), the total annual amount transferred by the NOC would approximate $22.8 billion in 2025.
  • Monthly transfers of $1.9 billion by the NOC to the CBL do not include fuel and energy costs.
  • Fuel and energy barter agreements internally amount to $375 million monthly ($4.5 billion annually) or 12% of Libya’s oil and gas production share.
  • Monthly transfers of $1.9 billion from the NOC to the CBL exclude $750 million monthly for barter and fuel and energy agreements, totaling $9 billion annually or 25% of Libya’s oil production share.”

He summarized: “Libya’s annual oil and gas revenues amount to $36.3 billion, distributed as follows:

  • $22.8 billion transferred to the CBL.
  • $4.5 billion for local and external fuel and gas barter agreements.
  • $9.0 billion for external oil and gas barter agreements.”

Husni Bey posed critical questions:

  • “Do we accept that $13.5 billion (37.3% of Libya’s share) is wasted through excessive consumption, legitimized theft, and smuggling?
  • Does the monthly $1.9 billion or annual $22.8 billion suffice to cover 93% of the remaining public expenditure after subsidy costs, at an exchange rate of 4.850, 5.500, or 6.000?
  • What is the appropriate exchange rate that should be adopted to prevent the budget from being financed by deficits, thus avoiding further collapse?”

Exclusive: Al-Zantouti: “The Real Issue is the Inability to Determine a Fair Exchange Rate for the Dinar”

Financial expert Khaled Al-Zantouti told our source exclusively, “For years, we have failed to establish a fair exchange rate for the dinar, one that is determined using standard economic models based on recognized macro and microeconomic variables.”

Al-Zantouti added, “Over the years, the exchange rate for our dinar has been determined by a group of speculators in the Souq Al-Mushir, driven by their interests and benefits. These individuals (not to generalize) manipulate the supply of dollars to control the rate. This occurs amid the absence of effective monetary policies from the Central Bank of Libya, which has remained a passive observer without monetary policy tools or authority over the reckless spending of competing governments. These governments, in some cases, collaborate with those speculators in a covert agreement to undermine the dinar’s strength.”

He continued, “Amid this shameful and consumption-driven competition and the collusion of crisis traders, the Central Bank remains paralyzed, unable to address the dinar’s plight. This paralysis stems from the lack of integration between monetary, fiscal, and trade policies, not to mention the uncertainty around how the exchange rate is determined—whether it’s fixed, flexible, or subject to partial or full floating.”

“These cumulative factors make it extremely difficult to estimate the exchange rate for 2025 scientifically or objectively. Unfortunately, indicators suggest a continuation of the confusion and speculation that marked previous years.”

Al-Zantouti also noted, “It is evident that the Central Bank, under its new administration, is attempting to establish a foundation for its monetary policy and regulate the currency exchange market. While this effort is commendable, it will likely take time. Ultimately, the Souq Al-Mushir will remain the decisive factor in determining the exchange rate.”

He highlighted the Central Bank’s ability to defend the current exchange rate (with the 15% tax) by ensuring dollar supply, combating inflation, maintaining foreign currency reserves, and potentially using these reserves if oil revenues decline. He remarked, “If the Central Bank manages to maintain the current rate between 6.10 and 6.40, under the present circumstances, it would be a significant achievement.”

Al-Zantouti concluded, “Given the prevailing conditions of unchecked government spending, political instability, and uncertainty around oil prices and production, the Central Bank cannot fundamentally address the exchange rate issue or set a fair and sustainable rate for the long term. However, if it succeeds in maintaining the range of 6.10–6.30 this year, it would undoubtedly be a positive accomplishment. We hope for this outcome.”

Exclusive: Saber Al-Wahsh Questions Central Bank’s Ability to Sustain Current Exchange Rate Amid Declining Foreign Currency Revenues

Economic expert Saber Al-Wahsh exclusively told our source that the exchange rate is a product of interaction rather than a decision.

He explained: “Although adjusting the exchange rate is issued by the Central Bank, its execution relies on the government and the National Oil Corporation. The Central Bank’s role is limited to addressing emergency circumstances using available reserves. Over the past year, the Central Bank utilized $8 billion in reserves to maintain the current exchange rate.”

He added: “But how long can the Central Bank defend this rate amidst clear declines in foreign currency revenues and expanded deficit spending? The answer lies with the National Oil Corporation through the revenues it generates and with the governments through their expenditures. Essentially, the Corporation and the governments are the ones determining the currency exchange rate.”

Al-Wahsh further stated: “If the issues related to barter trade are resolved, fuel imports are organized, and spending is rationalized, we may witness some stability in the exchange rate. However, if the current situation persists, an exchange rate adjustment will not be far off, which is something we hope to avoid.”

Misbah Al-Akari: “Under These Conditions, the Liquidity Problem Will Be Fully Resolved by 2025”

Former member of the Central Bank of Libya’s Exchange Rate Committee, Misbah Al-Akari, stated: “The liquidity problem will be fully resolved by 2025 provided that all stakeholders (citizens, the private sector, and government entities) commit to using alternative payment tools, which have already become widely available and are expected to grow even further in 2025. This will be supported by additional incentives, such as significantly reducing fees and enabling citizens to use up to 60% of their salaries via these tools when due.

Al-Akari added: “When everyone commits to adopting this modern approach to transactions, the long queues of humiliation will become a thing of the past. These tools will ensure fairness, eliminate favoritism in cash withdrawals, and curb the financing of currency speculators, which has led to a 35% discrepancy in the Libyan dinar’s exchange rate on the investment side.

Clarifying the steps for implementing these modern tools, Al-Akari explained: “Activating the unrestricted Mudarabah (Islamic finance product) will allow commercial banks to invest their excess funds with the Central Bank, increasing their revenues and enabling them to further reduce fees for their clients. Additionally, this product will provide commercial banks the opportunity to open investment accounts and restricted Mudarabah products for their customers, creating an investment-friendly environment. Citizens and business owners will be able to utilize such products to grow their funds. These investments will have significant positive effects not only for the investors themselves but also for the Libyan economy as a whole. Moreover, these investments will help absorb a considerable portion of the money supply, the primary driver of foreign currency price increases.

Al-Akari further noted that by 2025, after mitigating and eventually resolving the liquidity problem and expanding electronic services to reduce congestion at banks, the banks will be well-positioned to return to their fundamental role as financial intermediaries. They will then be able to offer loans and facilities for both small and large-scale projects, contributing to greater diversification of the Libyan economy through these financial tools.

The insistence of the Central Bank of Libya on the shift to electronic transactions, which is supported by all experts and specialists in this field, is due to the following reasons:

  1. Electronic payment tools directly eliminate the need for paper currency except in limited contexts.
  2. This transformation reduces overcrowding at banks.
  3. It enables banking services to be accessed from home or the office without visiting a bank.
  4. It puts an end to corruption associated with cash withdrawal operations.
  5. It provides statistical data that can be used for studies relevant to the national economy.

Exclusive: Upcoming Meeting of the Central Bank Board of Directors Next Sunday to Discuss Exchange Rate and Tax

Our sources within the banking sector have revealed that the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Libya is scheduled to hold a meeting next Sunday.

According to the sources, the discussion will include the topics of the exchange rate and taxes.

Addressing Exchange Rates, Economic and Banking Conditions: IMF Issues Key Statement on Meetings with the Central Bank of Libya and Recommendations

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) welcomed the agreement to resolve the leadership dispute at the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and expressed its support for the bank’s efforts to facilitate access to foreign currency and alleviate local currency shortages.

The IMF emphasized the importance of Libyan authorities agreeing on spending priorities through a unified budget for 2025.

A team led by Mr. Dmitry Gershenson visited Tunis from December 2-6 to discuss Libya’s recent economic developments, macroeconomic forecasts, and policy priorities.

Mr. Gershenson stated that the September resolution of the CBL leadership dispute, supported by UNSMIL and other international partners, marks a significant step forward. A new governor and board were appointed, ending a decade of deadlock.

The IMF noted the need for structured leadership transitions to enhance stability and governance and welcomed continued collaboration with the CBL and other authorities.

The team discussed Libya’s macroeconomic adjustments following disruptions in oil production during August and September. GDP growth and financial projections for 2024 were revised downward, but 2025 growth is expected to rebound with increased oil production.

The IMF highlighted the risks of lower oil prices and political tensions, stressing the need for a unified budget for 2025. Fiscal discipline remains a priority, as outlined in the Article IV Consultation Report for 2024.

Efforts to modernize monetary policy tools were also discussed to improve the CBL’s role in managing the foreign exchange market. Key steps included reducing the foreign exchange tax, expanding personal allowances, and narrowing the gap between official and parallel exchange rates.

The IMF praised the CBL’s measures to address currency shortages by injecting liquidity and promoting electronic payment services. Structural and subsidy reforms, including energy subsidy adjustments, were highlighted as essential for diversifying Libya’s economy and supporting long-term growth.

The IMF also commended progress in governance, AML/CFT frameworks, and data collection. It reiterated its commitment to providing technical assistance in areas like tax policy, budget preparation, and monetary policy.

The next Article IV mission is planned for April 2025.

With Details: Al-Safi: “The New Leadership of the Central Bank Relies on a Strategy of Providing Market-Reassuring Information”

Economic expert Mohamed Al-Safi published an article on his page, discussing the use of information as a monetary tool in Libya.

When monetary tools are mentioned, discussions often focus on traditional instruments such as interest rates or exchange rates. However, positive and disciplined communication with the market is an equally significant monetary tool.

The new leadership of the Central Bank of Libya has begun to clearly demonstrate its characteristics, effectively employing one of the strongest monetary tools at its disposal: good communication and information dissemination.

The new management relies on a strategy of delivering information that reassures the market, leveraging the principle that “capital is cowardly” to steer it away from speculative markets and reduce speculators’ impact on the Libyan economy. This strategy is not limited to information sharing but extends to restoring trust through consistent decision-making and defending those decisions in practice. The alignment between declared policies and their transparent implementation fosters confidence in the institution, signaling that the Central Bank has a clear plan and is determined to execute it.

This approach marks a departure from the previous management, which often caused market anxiety and used information negatively (e.g., raising the red flag in 2015), destabilizing the market. In contrast, the current leadership employs realistic reassurance as a tool to prevent market chaos.

Exchange Rate Messages as a Model for Monetary Communication
Messages concerning exchange rates are a prime example of using communication as a monetary tool. The Central Bank has conveyed clear signals about its intention to lower the exchange rate, reducing incentives for capital that had previously engaged in speculative dollar trading for profit. This strategy lessens artificial demand for the dollar as a speculative commodity and promotes its real use for trade and imports.

Liquidity Management and New Banknote Announcement
Regarding liquidity issues, announcing the printing of new banknotes might encourage those holding large sums outside the banking system (so-called “under the mattress” savings) to deposit these funds in banks, fearing future difficulties in using them. This measure could reintegrate part of the money circulating outside the banking system into the official economic cycle.

Challenges to Success
Despite its promising approach, there are risks that could hinder these policies, including:

  1. A decline in oil revenues might weaken the Central Bank’s ability to defend the current exchange rate unless reserves are utilized.
  2. Any disruptions in electronic payment systems or delays in printing new currency could undermine trust in the Bank’s ability to execute its strategy.

Conclusion
Relying on information as a monetary tool reflects a strategic shift in the Central Bank’s management. The aim is to build trust, reduce speculation, and steer the economy toward stability. However, achieving complete success requires addressing external challenges and enhancing coordination between monetary and fiscal policies.

Abu Snina: “No Stability for the Libyan Dinar Exchange Rate Without Oil Revenues”

The economic expert, Mohamed Abu Snina, wrote an article stating:

In Brief, the focus of Libyan decision-makers, those shaping the current landscape and challenging authority, remains limited to finding short-term solutions to economic problems such as the exchange rate, public spending, liquidity, fuel subsidies, salaries, and oil production. These areas suffer from recurring distortions that merely reflect symptoms of the deeper issue plaguing the economy: the heavy reliance on crude oil export revenues, a rentier culture, and the resulting deadlock. This perpetuates a vicious cycle of dependency, sustaining a mono-economy with no clear vision for reform.

The salary bill inflates public expenditure, leading to exchange rate instability. Exchange rate instability puts pressure on reserves, which in turn restricts foreign currency use. This limitation reduces liquidity, increases the black-market exchange rate, and subsequently leads to a liquidity crisis. The public’s lack of trust in the banking sector worsens, increasing reliance on public expenditure. Allocating funds to develop the oil sector comes at the expense of other development projects. Thus, addressing any existing economic problem or distortion often exacerbates another, because the root cause is structural. There is no public spending or budget funding without oil revenues.

There can be no stability for the Libyan dinar exchange rate without oil revenues. No letters of credit for importing goods, supplies, and services can be issued without oil revenues. Salaries for approximately 2.8 million Libyans depend on oil revenues, as do fuel supplies for electricity and transportation. Fuel subsidies, which already strain the state’s budget, also rely on oil revenues. Even the development of the oil sector itself is unattainable without these revenues.

Decision-makers ignore the fact that oil is an exhaustible resource that may deplete within less than 25 years—a brief period in the lifespan of a state. Additionally, oil is losing market share to clean and alternative energy sources in the medium term, a reality given little attention. Oil prices are on a downward trend, and the exploitation of oil revenues fails to consider the rights of future generations, regional development needs, or the global climate crisis.

Why have successive governments failed to create and implement a serious strategy for economic diversification? Instead, they merely extinguish recurring crises. The Libyan Sovereign Wealth Fund, valued at over $60 billion, has yet to contribute to financing the state’s budget deficit, contrary to its foundational goals. Meanwhile, Libya’s other natural resources remain unutilized and ignored due to the prevailing conditions. Exploiting these resources requires investing oil revenues strategically, but those revenues are barely sufficient to cover salary bills.

There is no choice, priority, or alternative—before it is too late—to save Libya’s economy, the state’s future, and the coming generations other than by diversifying income sources, restructuring the national economy, halting the expansion of consumer spending and subsidies, breaking oil’s dominance over the economy, and reforming institutions while combating corruption—all within a defined timeframe.

Exclusive: Al-Shhumi Comments on Central Bank Board’s Decisions, Says Priorities Should Include Reevaluating the Exchange Rate

Economic expert Suleiman Al-Shhumi spoke exclusively to Sada Economic newspaper, commenting on the recent decisions made by the Board of the Central Bank of Libya during its first meeting, part of a short-term plan aimed at providing a positive boost to the Libyan community and the financial and economic sectors. However, he expressed concerns that the Board’s decisions might have set expectations too high, suggesting they should have been more precise, especially regarding the opening of interbank clearing between the east and west.

He explained that the decision to open interbank clearing requires more than a decree from the Central Bank; it demands genuine intent, with clear, positive steps announced for opening it. This is particularly important because clearing is linked to settling the accumulated public debt held in the Central Bank’s branch in Benghazi. Such a settlement requires a political decision (a legislative decision by both councils) and the Bank’s actual ability to implement it on the ground by carrying out the settlement and opening clearing comprehensively, rather than through the temporary balance transfers previously attempted.

Al-Shhumi added that, in the past, the Central Bank claimed it had opened clearing, but existing issues created obstacles to a full and comprehensive clearing process. The Bank also made optimistic promises for the future, such as implementing lease financing under the 2010 law, though this law may need significant amendments to enable the proper establishment of lease financing companies, along with time to organize it effectively.

He further noted that opening the currency exchanges requires exchange rate stability and an adequate supply of foreign currency, among other conditions that may not be immediately achievable. On investment and deposit usage, he suggested the Board should prioritize applying the law that reinstated traditional interest, passed in 2023, and questioned why this law has not been implemented.

Al-Shuhumi argued that the Central Bank should focus on its core role in managing the exchange rate. He highlighted that the Bank’s statement did not indicate any plans to reassess the exchange rate, nor did it address the tax on foreign currency sales despite court rulings calling for its repeal. While the recent decisions convey a positive and necessary message, he believes some will be difficult to implement. Moreover, the statement ignored key issues central to the Bank’s role, such as exchange rate management, transparency, and how the Bank intends to address the presence of two governments in the country.

Exclusive: Wali Writes: “Toward a Sustainable Economy and Stable Exchange Rate”

The economic expert, Ibrahim Wali, penned an article exclusively for our source, stating:

“To date, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) has taken commendable steps appreciated by citizens and the Libyan monetary market. However, these steps are temporary unless accompanied by the missing fiscal policy and the dormant trade policy under the Ministry of Economy. One hand cannot clap alone, and the CBL cannot sustain these measures for more than six months to a year without cooperation from the Ministry of Finance and the failed Ministry of Economy. Economic policy is not crafted by one entity but requires the synchronization of three pillars: monetary, fiscal, and trade policies.

Economic Stability Requires Coordination
Sustainable economic stability hinges on maintaining a continuous and stable exchange rate, fiscal stability free of parallel expenditures and public fund mismanagement, and trade stability represented by lower prices for essential goods such as food and medicine. This responsibility falls on the “sleeping” Ministry of Economy. To date, there has been no meeting uniting the heads of the three policy pillars—CBL Governor, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Economy—at a single table to address these issues collectively. Instead, each operates in isolation.

It is evident that the Ministries of Finance and Economy show little concern for fluctuations in the exchange rate, leaving the CBL to perform miracles to stabilize it and secure foreign currency—largely dependent on oil revenues. If oil ports are shut down or international oil prices drop below $72 per barrel, the Ministry of Finance will struggle to pay salaries.

Fiscal Policy: The Starting Point for Reform
Reform must begin with fiscal policy, as it governs revenue collection and expenditure. When spending conflicts with monetary policy, it inevitably undermines monetary stability. Consequently, criticisms of the CBL’s monetary policy failures are misplaced; the root cause lies in unaligned fiscal and trade policies.

Temporary Measures with Uncertain Outcomes
While the CBL’s recent measures are a step in the right direction, they remain temporary—likely effective for six months to a year unless fiscal and trade policies align. Without this coordination, the CBL will be unable to maintain exchange rate stability or supply foreign currency to two competing governments—one in the East and another in the West—amid parallel expenditures.

The decision to implement these measures all at once is a point of concern. While it may succeed, the risks are significant, and failure could result in worse outcomes than before.

A Call for Comprehensive Strategy
Many experts, myself included, believe the CBL should have waited to implement its measures until its Board of Directors convened to outline a cohesive monetary strategy. This should have been followed by collaborative meetings with the Ministries of Finance and Economy to develop a comprehensive strategy for Libya’s economic policies. Such coordination is essential for achieving sustainable exchange rate stability, addressing parallel expenditures, unifying the national budget, and tackling the rising costs of essential goods and services.

Without this broader strategy, the current measures offer only short-term relief. If no action is taken within the next year, the situation risks deteriorating to levels worse than before—God forbid.”